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A Introduction

A plurality of the United Nations Human Rights Council member States decided
in June 2014 to establish an Intergovernmental Working Group “to elaborate
an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human
rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”1
Led by Ecuador and South Africa and supported by 20 Council member
States (14 States opposed, including the US and the UK, while 13 abstained), and
preceded by advocacy by hundreds of civil society organizations, the Council
thus initiated a process to draft a treaty on business and human rights. The
first meeting of the Working Group is to take place in Geneva in July 2015; the
drafting process will likely take years.
There are many questions as to what will happen once the Working Group
convenes. Will the negotiations succeed? If there is to be a treaty on business
and human rights, what kind of treaty? Possibilities range from a treaty imposing minimal reporting requirements on corporations to one authorizing a special
court where business entities may be sued or criminally prosecuted for human
rights violations. What are the key issues the drafters will need to address under various treaty options? And if some form of treaty is adopted, what are its
chances of being widely ratified by States? Or will it risk becoming, in effect, an
international law orphan?
The American Bar Association Center for Human Rights, and the Law Society of England and Wales invited the present authors to prepare an informational
“White Paper” on these questions. The Paper does not intend to advocate either
for or against a treaty on business and human rights. Nor does it undertake to
support or oppose any particular form or substance of a treaty. Its purpose is
purely informational: to educate ABA and Law Society members and other interested persons about treaty issues and options. Views expressed in this Paper are
strictly those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the ABA or its Center
for Human Rights, or of the Law Society.
The remainder of this Paper is divided into four sections: background and
context; existing international legal obligations of business in regard to human
rights; options for the content of a treaty; and selected key issues.
B

Background and Context

A generation ago it was often argued that only States had institutional responsibilities to safeguard human rights, and that only State actors could violate human rights. In recent years the predominant view has changed dramatically. By
2014, a reputable survey indicated that senior corporate executives “overwhelmingly perceive a responsibility to protect human rights,”2 while all 47 member
1

Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9, ¶ 1 (June 26, 2014).
The Economist Intelligence Unit, The Road from Principles to Practice: Report Summary, The Economist (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.economistinsights.com/business2
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States of the UN Human Rights Council (including the US), acting by consensus, called upon “all business enterprises to meet their responsibility to respect
human rights in accordance with the [UN] Guiding Principles [on Business and
Human Rights].”3
How did we arrive at this new consensus?
This Paper is not the place to recount the long and tortuous history of debates
in the UN over business and human rights, going back at least to the 1970s.4
We focus here on only the latest chapter of that history, beginning a little more
than a decade ago.
B.1

UN Mandate of John Ruggie on Business and Human Rights

In 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights (later reconstituted as the Human Rights Council) asked UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to appoint a special representative on the issue of “human rights and transnational corporations
and other business enterprises.”5 Annan appointed Harvard University political
scientist John Ruggie. The focus of Ruggie’s mandate, and of business and human rights discourse, has paid special (but not exclusive) attention to the role of
transnational businesses and their investments and operations in host States—
addressing issues of the impact of such companies in operations outside of their
home jurisdictions.
Ruggie’s initial mandate was, among other things, to “identify and clarify
standards of corporate responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to human rights;” and to
“elaborate on the role of States in effectively regulating and adjudicating the
role of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to
human rights, including through international cooperation.”6
Ruggie’s appointment flowed from a decision of the UN Human Rights Council not to adopt an earlier instrument that attempted to define the legal responsibilities of corporations with respect to human rights. The draft “Norms on
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” was approved in 2003 by the United Nastrategy/analysis/road-principles-practice. In a late 2014 survey of some 850 senior corporate executives, the Economist found that companies “overwhelmingly perceive a responsibility
to protect human rights.” Id. Over 80% of execs surveyed agreed that business is “an important
player in respecting human rights.” The Economist Intelligence Unit, The Road from Principles
to Practice: Today’s Challenges for Business in Respecting Human Rights, The Economist
(Mar.
16,
2015),
http://www.economistinsights.com/sites/default/files/EIUURG%20-%20Challenges%20for%20business%20in%20respecting%20human%20rights%20WEB_
corrected%20logos%20and%20UNWG%20thx.pdf.
3 Human Rights Council Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22, at ¶ 3 (July 15, 2014).
4 See John Ruggie, Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty
Sponsors, Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus. (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/quovadis-unsolicited-advice-business.html.
5 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2005/69, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20,
2005).
6 Id.
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tions Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.7 The
Norms applied a long list of treaties and international instruments to transnational corporations.8 Critics of the Norms, among other objections, viewed them
as too prescriptive.9
While non-binding, the Draft Norms were crafted with the aspiration to extend human rights obligations to companies as well as states. The preamble recognized that even though States have the “primary responsibility” to protect
human rights, “transnational corporations and other business enterprises, as organs of society, are also responsible for promoting and securing the human rights
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”10 The draft Norms also
stated as an objective that every effort should be made that the norms be “generally known and respected.”
The draft Norms were considered by the UN Commission on Human Rights
in 2004. The Commission “express[ed] its appreciation to the Sub-Commission
for the work it has undertaken in preparing the draft norms” and said they contained “useful elements and ideas for consideration.” But it did not approve them
and said they had ”no legal standing.”11 Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral (“SRSG”) Ruggie was then appointed so that the UN could undertake
a more systematic study of the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.
B.2

UN Framework on Business and Human Rights: “Protect,
Respect, Remedy”

After extensive studies and consultations with diverse stakeholders worldwide,
in 2008 Ruggie recommended a three-part “Framework” on business and human rights: “Protect, Respect and Remedy.”12 In summary, the Framework “comprises three core principles:”
• “the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties,
including business;”
• “the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and”
• “the need for more effective access to remedies.”
7 Subcomm. on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12 (2003).
8 Id.
9 See Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Interim Report on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 56–69, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) (by John Ruggie), for a summary critique.
10 Id. at 7.
11 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights Dec. 2004/116, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/127 (Apr. 20, 2004).
12 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework
for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie).
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“The three principles form a complementary whole in that each supports the
others in achieving sustainable progress.”13
Ruggie explained:
Business is the major source of investment and job creation, and
markets can be highly efficient means for allocating scarce resources.
They constitute powerful forces capable of generating economic growth,
reducing poverty, and increasing demand for the rule of law, thereby
contributing to the realization of a broad spectrum of human rights.
But markets work optimally only if they are embedded within rules,
customs and institutions. Markets themselves require these to survive and thrive, while society needs them to manage the adverse effects of market dynamics and produce the public goods that markets
undersupply.14
Ruggie identified the “root cause” of contemporary problems involving business and human rights as “governance gaps”:
Governance gaps created by globalization—between the scope and
impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to
manage their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide
the permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all
kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation. How to narrow
and ultimately bridge the gaps in relation to human rights is our
fundamental challenge.15
The three-part Framework was Ruggie’s response to those governance gaps. Under existing international human rights law, he noted, States have the legal duty
to protect persons within their jurisdiction from human rights violations, including those committed by business16 (or in which business is complicit).17 This has
come to be known as “Pillar One” of the three-part Framework.
What is now called “Pillar Two” of the Framework is the business responsibility to respect human rights. Ruggie articulated the general business “responsibility to respect,” not as a new international legal obligation, but as a duty assumed “because it is the basic expectation society has of business.”18 It is “part
of what is sometimes called a company’s social license to operate.”19
Ruggie noted that international organizations such as the International Labour
Organization and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, as well as major business organizations, and the thousands of individual
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

Id. at 4–5, ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
Id. at 3, ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. at 7–8, ¶¶ 18–22.
Id.
Id. at 4–5, ¶ 9.
Id. at 16–17, ¶ 54.
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companies that have joined the UN Global Compact, recognize that business
has a responsibility to respect human rights.20
What does the business responsibility to respect human rights mean? In essence
it has two components. The first is a negative obligation: “To respect rights essentially means not to infringe on the rights of others—put simply, to do no
harm.”21
The second is a positive responsibility: “What is required is due diligence—a
process whereby companies not only ensure compliance with national laws but
also manage the risk of human rights harm with a view to avoiding it,” mitigating
it, and providing remediation in the event harm occurs. “The scope of human
rights-related due diligence is determined by the context in which a company is
operating, its activities, and the relationships associated with those activities.”22
These dual responsibilities apply to all human rights as enumerated in a core
set of human rights treaties: “Because companies can affect virtually all internationally recognized rights, they should consider the responsibility to respect
in relation to all such rights, although some may require greater attention in
particular contexts.”23
Finally, meeting these two responsibilities is not always enough: “There are
situations in which companies may have additional responsibilities—for example, where they perform certain public functions, or because they have undertaken additional commitments voluntarily. But the responsibility to respect is
the baseline expectation for all companies in all situations.”24
The Third Pillar of the Framework requires a remedy for victims when human rights violations occur. States have a responsibility to provide both judicial
and non-judicial remedies, while business has a responsibility to provide nonjudicial remedies for violations in which it is involved.25
By consensus, the UN Human Rights Council formally “welcome[d]” Ruggie’s three-part Framework and recognized the “need to operationalize” it. Extending his mandate for three years, the Council asked him to elaborate on the
Framework, and encouraged governments, business and civil society to cooperate with him.26

20

Id. at 8, ¶ 23.
Id. at 9, ¶ 24.
22 Id. at 9, ¶ 25.
23 Id. at 9, ¶ 24. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, later drafted by
Ruggie and endorsed by the Human Rights Council in 2011, specifically identify, as a minimum set
of human rights instruments to be respected by business in all contexts, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the International Labour Organization’s Declaration
of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Guiding Principles, supra note 12, at 13, ¶ 12. See
generally infra section V.B.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 24–27.
26 Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7 (June 18, 2008).
21
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B.3 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
After further research and consultations, Ruggie in 2011 presented a set of some
31 “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,” together with commentaries on each Principle.27 Principles 1-10 cover the State duty to protect;
Principles 11-24 detail the business responsibility to respect; and Principles 2531 address the need to provide victims access to effective remedies. Noting the
“painfully slow” nature of treaty negotiations, Ruggie stated that he had considered and ruled out the treaty option “at this time” in order to focus initially
on what he viewed as a more timely means to close the governance gap and to
provide victims access to a remedy sooner rather than later.28 (Ruggie’s position,
as discussed below, has evolved since then.)
The UN Human Rights Council, again by consensus, formally “endorse[d]”
the Guiding Principles, now known as the “UN Guiding Principles.”29 In addition to the ongoing mandate of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
the Council established a Working Group of five independent experts to monitor
and promote effective implementation of the Guiding Principles.30 It also established an annual Forum on Business and Human Rights, under the guidance
of the Working Group, to facilitate dialogue and exchange on implementation
of the Guiding Principles, as well as on issues of business and human rights
generally.31 The Council also made clear that its endorsement of the Guiding
Principles by no means closed the door on further initiatives.32
Assisted by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
the expert Working Group has since 2011 conducted studies and consultations,
and issued reports and recommendations.33 The Working Group has particularly
encouraged States to adopt National Action Plans to implement the Guiding
Principles. It has published a set of guidelines, both for the content of plans and
for the process by which plans are adopted.34 Beginning in 2013, several States
27 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
28 John Ruggie, Treaty road not travelled, Ethical Corporation, May 2008, at 42–43. Ruggie
also argued that a treaty-making process “now” could undermine “effective shorter-term measures,”
and noted “serious questions” about how a treaty would be enforced. Id. at 42.
29 Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, ¶ 1 (July 6, 2011).
30 Id. ¶ 6.
31 Id. ¶ 12.
32 As aptly summarized by the International Commission of Jurists, the Resolution “notes that
the Guiding Principles were adopted without prejudice to ‘any future initiatives, such as a relevant,
comprehensive international framework.’ [The Resolution] also states that adoption of the Guiding
Principles did ‘not foreclose any other long-term development, including further enhancement of
standards’ …and requested the new Working Group …to: ‘continue to explore options and make
recommendations at the national, regional and international levels for enhancing access to effective
remedies…”’ Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Needs and Options for a New International Instrument
in the Field of Business and Human Rights 5 (June 2014) [hereinafter ICJ Report].
33 See generally Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other
Business
Enterprises,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/
WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2015).
34 U.N. Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National Action Plans
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have adopted National Action Plans, and a dozen or so additional national plans
are currently in preparation (including in the US).35 The UN Guiding Principles
emphasize that States have a critical role to play and can use a “smart mix”
of measures—national and international, mandatory and voluntary—to foster
business respect for human rights.36 Companies, too, have made progress in
adopting human rights policies, strengthening due diligence processes, and in
other aspects of implementing the Guiding Principles.37 The legal profession has
also been active in promoting the Guiding Principles.38
B.4 Debate Over a Treaty on Business and Human Rights
Frustration, however, remains. Many human rights groups report that, on the
ground, not much has improved since the adoption of the Guiding Principles.39
And there is widespread recognition that Pillar Three of the Guiding Principles—
access to effective judicial and non-judicial remedies—does not seem to have
made meaningful progress. Daunting legal and practical obstacles continue to
thwart access to justice for parties adversely affected by corporate involvement
in human rights abuses, especially in the transnational context.40 Indeed, in some
on Business and Human Rights Version 1.01 (Dec. 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf.
35 State National Action Plans, United Nations Human Rights (Oct. 24, 2015, 4:00 PM),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx.
36 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, supra note 12, at 8, ¶ 3.
37 See generally, e.g., World Business Council on Social Development, Scaling Up Action on
Human Rights: Operationalizing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(2014),
http://www.wbcsd.org/Pages/EDocument/EDocumentDetails.aspx?ID=16382&
NoSearchContextKey=true. Thirty-four of the world’s largest fifty companies now have a
publicly available statement on human rights. Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., LAUNCH:
Corporate & Government Action on Human Rights Revealed, Business-HumanRights.org
(Feb. 25, 2015), http://business-humanrights.org/en/launch-corporate-governmentaction-on-human-rights-revealed?utm_source=Business+%26+human+rights+-+Weekly+
Update&utm_campaign=df1a8c93f3-Weekly_Update_25_February_20152_24_2015&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_3a0b8cd0d0-df1a8c93f3-174128041. The first reporting framework specifically on the Guiding Principles has recently been introduced. U.N. Guiding Principles
Reporting Framework, First Comprehensive Guidance for Companies on Human Rights Reporting
Launches in London, Shift and Mazars (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.ungpreporting.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/UNGPRF_launchPR_20Feb20151.pdf.
38 See infra section V.G.
39 See, e.g., Video: Closing Remarks of Audrey Gaughran of Amnesty International
in the U.N. Forum on Business and Human Rights, UN Web TV (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/human-rights-council/forum-on-businessand-human-rights/watch/closing-conversation-strategic-paths-forward-forum-onbusiness-and-human-rights-2014/3925402001001.
40 See generally, e.g., Jennifer Zerk, Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses: Towards a Fairer and More Effective System of Domestic Law Remedies (2014), http://www.ohchr.
org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf;
G. Skinner, R. McCorquodale and O. De Schutter, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial
Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (Dec. 2013). The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has commenced a large work plan focused on the access to remedy for gross human rights abuses. See Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Initiative on Enhancing Accountability and Access to
Remedy in Cases of Business Involvement in Human Rights Abuses (Oct. 25, 2015) http:
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respects, notably in the United States and the United Kingdom, access to judicial
remedies for human rights violations involving business has actually been limited
since the adoption of the Guiding Principles.41
By 2013 a debate was well underway among governments and within the
human rights community.42 Some argued that the Guiding Principles were still
quite new and growing in impact, and that all stakeholders needed more time to
implement them more fully. Others contended that the Guiding Principles were
in any event too weak to overcome what they perceived as business resistance
to accountability, and that more time would only prolong their ineffectiveness.
In their view, a more effective, “hard law” tool was needed.
In September 2013, Ecuador, claiming the support of some 85 countries,
urged the UN Human Rights Council to take up the issue of a legally binding
treaty on business and human rights.43 In November 2013, civil society groups
meeting in Bangkok, Thailand issued a Joint Statement echoing the call.44 More
than 600 civil society groups have now reportedly joined the call for a legally
binding treaty.45
In June 2014, as noted above, the UN Human Rights Council decided to
establish an Intergovernmental Working Group “to elaborate an international
legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”46
Led by Ecuador and South Africa, the initiative was supported by a plurality of only 20 of the 47 member States of the Council. Fourteen States opposed
and thirteen abstained. There was a notable geopolitical and geo-economic pattern in the vote. All States voting in favor were from Africa or Asia, except for
Cuba, Ecuador, Russia and Venezuela. The opposing States included all European States on the Council (except Russia), plus the US, UK, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The abstentions included four major Latin American economies
//www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OHCHRstudyondomesticlawremedies.aspx.
41 In the United States, the Supreme Court in 2013 ruled that overseas human rights violations
may not be litigated in federal courts under the Alien Tort Statute except where they sufficiently
“touch and concern” the U.S. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
Cutbacks in U.K. legal aid funding likewise threaten the ability of British law firms to pursue overseas
human rights violations. See Michael Goldhaber, Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S.
Courts: A Comparative Scorecard, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 127, 133–34 (2013).
42 For a wide-ranging analysis of whether a treaty is needed, see ICJ Report, supra note 30, at
15–33.
43 Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., Calls for a Binding Treaty on Business and Human Rights—
Perspectives, Business-Humanrights.org (Dec. 6, 2013), http://business-humanrights.org/
en/calls-for-a-binding-treaty-on-business-human-rights-perspectives.
44 People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business, Bangkok, Thai. Nov. 5–7, 2013, Joint Statement: Call for an International Legally Binding Instrument on Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (Nov. 2013) [hereinafter People’s Forum on Human Rights
and Business Joint Statement].
45 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), FIDH and ESCR-Net New Joint “Treaty
Initiative” (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-HumanRights/globalisation-human-rights/business-and-human-rights/16868-fidh-andescr-net-new-joint-treaty-initiative.
46 H.R.C. Res. 26/9, supra note 1, ¶ 1
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(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru), three African States, three Gulf States and
one Asian State.
Opposition by the US, UK and European Union States was intense. Not only
did they vote against the resolution, they stated that they would refuse to participate in the Intergovernmental Working Group. The US objected on multiple
grounds, arguing that:
• A treaty negotiating process “will unduly polarize these issues.”
• States have not had enough time to implement the Guiding Principles,
which have already made a meaningful difference, but which will now
be undermined by this “competing initiative.”
• A one-size-fits-all instrument is not the right approach to the complexities
of regulating business.
• In contrast to the global applicability of the Guiding Principles, a treaty
would bind only states that become party to it.
• An “intergovernmental” working group will not benefit from participation
by key stakeholders, including business.
• There are practical questions about how an international binding instrument would apply to corporations, which, the US contended, are not subjects of international law; yet one of the sponsors proposes to impose legal
obligations directly on businesses.
• The resolution seeks to regulate certain businesses and not others.47
This last objection—that the treaty might regulate some businesses and not
others—refers to a footnote in the preamble to the resolution. The resolution
proposes a treaty to regulate “transnational corporations and other business enterprises.” Yet the preambular footnote explains that the phrase, “other business
enterprises,” denotes “all business enterprises that have a transnational character
in their operational activities, and does not apply to local businesses registered in
terms of relevant domestic law.” This seems to exclude any business other than
transnational corporations from the scope of any treaty. (This apparent narrowing of focus from the broader Guiding Principles will be further discussed in Part
V below.)
That issue was among those addressed by John Ruggie in a September 2014
commentary. Cautioning against the legal and political difficulties inherent in negotiating a treaty on business and human rights, he urged the sponsors to pursue
a treaty that would cover “other business enterprises” as well as transnational
47 Statement by the Delegation of the U.S., Explanation of vote: A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1
on BHR Legally-Binding Instrument: Proposed Working Group Would Undermine Efforts to Implement Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (June 26, 2014),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/06/26/proposed-working-group-would-undermineefforts-to-implement-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights/.
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corporations; to appoint a prominent and consensus-seeking chair for the Intergovernmental Working Group; to ensure that the drafting process is broadly
inclusive of outside voices, including business; to conduct basic legal research
early in the process, including on corporate law and international investment
law; and to step up efforts to implement the UN Guiding Principles during the
predictably lengthy period of treaty negotiations.48 A variety of commentators
have begun to argue about the merits of a treaty, with experts lining up on both
sides of the debate.
In subsequent remarks at the UN Forum on Business and Human Rights in
Geneva in December 2014, Ruggie noted that the politics of imposing treaty
obligations on transnational corporations are becoming ever more challenging.
He pointed out that transnational companies from the global South—from countries like Brazil, China, India and South Africa—have become the world’s largest
in industries like oil, electronics and beer. He reiterated his earlier calls that any
treaty should focus on corporate involvement in “gross” human rights abuses.49
In that same Forum, Ecuador’s newly named Ambassador to the UN in Geneva,
Mar�a Fernanda Espinosa, announced that the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Working Group will take place in Geneva in July 2015. She stated further that civil society would be welcome to attend, that a treaty should not be
limited to transnational corporations, and that Ecuador and South Africa welcomed submissions beforehand from all interested parties.50 In response to this
and other statements, an EU representative seemed to leave open whether the
EU might participate after all in the Intergovernmental Working Group.51 It is
unclear at this writing how the business community will participate in the negotiation process. It appears that a joint set of comments will soon be submitted
to the UN by a coalition of global business organizations.52
48 John Ruggie, Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors,
Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Bus. (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/quo-vadisunsolicited-advice-business.html.
49 John Ruggie, Former U.N. Special Representative for Bus. and Human Rights, Closing Plenary Address at the,Third U.N. Forum on Business and Human Rights (Dec. 3,
2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ForumSession3/Submissions/
JohnRuggie_SR_SG_BHR.pdf.
50 Ecuador U.N. Ambassador, Address at the U.N. Forum on Business and Human Rights (Dec.
3, 2014) (personal notes of author in attendance).
51 Id.
52 On May 4, 2015, the International Organization of Employers (“IOE”) circulated to other
business groups for comment a draft set of observations on the treaty process, proposed to be submitted by the IOE, together with the Business & Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, International Chamber of Commerce, International Organisation of Employers, International Petroleum
Industry Environmental Conservation Association, and the World Business Council for Sustainable
Development. Posted excerpts from their initial draft stated that “the UN treaty process must not
undermine the ongoing implementation of the UN Guiding Principles…The UN treaty process
should address all companies, not only multinationals…A potential UN treaty process should build
on the UN “protect—respect—remedy” framework…The UN treaty process should be inclusive…”
Bus. & Human Rights Res. Ctr., Business organizations call for comments on draft observations
on UN business & human rights treaty process, Business-HumanRights.org (May. 22, 2015),
http://business-humanrights.org/en/business-organizations-call-for-comments-ondraft-observations-on-un-business-human-rights-treaty-process-22-may.
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Continued Implementation of UN Guiding Principles

Meanwhile, the process of implementing the UN Guiding Principles continues.
In June 2014, one day after voting on the controversial resolution on a treaty,
the Council adopted a second resolution by consensus.53 This resolution:
• Extends the mandate of the expert Working Group,
• Urges States to adopt National Action Plans or similar frameworks,
• Calls upon “all business enterprises to meet their responsibility to respect
human rights in accordance with the Guiding Principles,”
• Asks the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights to continue “work to
facilitate the sharing and exploration of the full range of legal options and
practical measures to improve access to remedy for victims of businessrelated human rights abuses, in collaboration with the Working Group,”
and
• Continues the annual Forum on Business and Human Rights.54
In 2013, the United Kingdom became the first country to publish a National Action Plan.55 One year later, President Obama announced that the United States
would launch a process to develop a National Action Plan for responsible business conduct, consistent with the UN Guiding Principles and other international
instruments.56 The US process is underway during 2015, with various stakeholder forums being held throughout the country.57 The US initiative addresses
not only human rights, but such other issues as anti-corruption and financial
transparency.
This, then, is the state of play as we write this analysis of treaty issues and
options in May 2015.
53 Human Rights Council Res. 26/L.1, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/L.1 (June 23 2014). A revised, final
version of this text was adopted as Human Rights Council Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22
(June 27, 2014). Quotations in the text above are from the final version.
54 The annual Forum on Business and Human Rights is scheduled to take place in Geneva on
November 16–18, 2015.
55 Sec’y of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Good Business: Implementing the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 2013, Cm. 8695, at 19 (UK).
56 Office of the Press Sec’y, Exec. Office of the President, Press Release, Fact Sheet:
The U.S. Global Anticorruption Agenda (Sept. 24, 2014).
57 See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, USG Nat’l Action Plan on Responsible Bus. Conduct: Frequently Asked Questions, HumanRights.gov (last updated Feb. 12, 2015),
http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/2015/usg-national-action-plan-on-responsiblebusiness-conduct/.
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C Existing International Legal Obligations of Business with
Respect to Human Rights
At present there is no comprehensive global treaty on business and human rights.
Nor do the UN Guiding Principles impose new or additional obligations under
international law.58
That does not mean that there are no current international laws imposing
human rights obligations on business corporations or business executives. Such
laws exist. But their coverage is scattered, often indirect, and incomplete.59
Before illustrating such laws, it bears mentioning that the modern human
rights project, while State-centered, has never been exclusively so. The foundational document of international human rights law is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its prefatory clause proclaims the Declaration as a
“common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end
that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for
these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, …”
(Emphasis added.)60
Business corporations are, of course, among the “organs of society” thus exhorted, not only to respect human rights, but also to promote respect for human
rights and by progressive measures to secure their effective observance.
But the prefatory clause of a General Assembly Declaration is not law. What
international legal obligations do business corporations and their executives
have to respect human rights?
Most of these obligations are indirect: international law obligates States to
use their domestic laws and institutions to protect the human rights of persons
within their jurisdiction, including from violations by third parties.61 States must
require third parties, including business, to refrain from harming people. In some
instances, State obligations to safeguard human rights also obligate States to require business to take positive steps to protect rights, whether by properly training private security forces, providing safe factories and workplaces, or paying
workers a minimum wage.
These State duties derive in part from general human rights treaties joined
by States. In the words of Pillar One of the Guiding Principles, existing interna58 “The Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies not in the creation of new international
law obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for States
and businesses; …Nothing in these Guiding Principles should be read as creating new international
law obligations, or as limiting or undermining any legal obligations a State may have undertaken
or be subject to under international law with regard to human rights.” Special Representative of the
Secretary General, Guiding Principles, supra note 27, at 5–6.
59 See generally ICJ Report, supra note 32, at 9–33.
60 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
61 See generally, e.g., Jean-Francois Akandji-Combe, Human Rights Handbooks, No. 7,
Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights, 14–16 (2007);
Eric Engle, Third Party Effect of Fundamental Rights (Drittwirkung), 5 Hanse L. Rev. 165, 168–
169 (2009).
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tional law imposes on States a “duty to protect” persons within their jurisdiction
from human rights violations committed by business. Wide-ranging global and
regional human rights treaties require States Parties to “ensure,”62 “secure,”63 or
“recognize” human rights,64 and to take measures to give effect to the rights.65
These commitments require States to take reasonable measures to prevent human rights violations, by granting State institutions the necessary powers and by
using “all those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature”
necessary to prevent violations; to investigate, prosecute, punish, and provide
reparations for violations; and, where possible, to restore rights that have been
violated.66
In addition, International Labour Organisation (“ILO”) treaties require States
to legislate and enforce minimum wages, maximum hours, safe working conditions, freedom of association, and so on. While these laws are formally directed
at States, the real objects of regulation, albeit indirectly, are business corporations.
62 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, ¶ 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368
(1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of
San Jose, Costa Rica” art. 1, ¶ 1, adopted on Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. B-32 [hereinafter American
Convention].
63 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 005.
64 Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) art. 1, adopted on June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter].
65 ICCPR, supra note 62, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173–174 (“Where not already provided for by existing
legislative or other measures, each State Party…undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights ….”); American Convention,
supra note 62, O.A.S.T.S art. 2: (“Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms…is not already
ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with
their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”); African Charter, supra note
64, 21 I.L.M at 2 (States shall recognize rights “and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other
measures to give effect to them.”).
66 Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 175 (July 29,
1988). To similar effect, see U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13
(2004); African Comm’n. Human & Peoples’ Rts., Social and Economic Rts. Action Center v. Nigeria, ¶¶ 43–48, Communication No. 155/96 (2001). As broadly explained by the Inter-American
Court in Velásquez Rodriguez, the State duty to ensure rights “implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public
power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of
human rights.…[T]he States must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide
compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation.” Velásquez Rodriguez, InterAm. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 166. Furthermore: “The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent
human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of
violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate
punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.� Velásquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. at ¶ 174. “This duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative
and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are
considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for damages.” Velásquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. at ¶ 175.
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For several reasons, these existing international laws are not adequate to ensure business respect for human rights. Not all general human rights or ILO
treaties are universally ratified; these treaties simply do not bind some States.
While general human rights treaties impose obligations on States, they lack specificity as to the scope of the duties States must impose on companies. In contrast,
ILO treaties are specific, but limited in scope to particular labor rights and violations.
And in any case, States may lack the will or capacity to carry out even those
specific commitments by which they have agreed to be bound. Many of these
treaties lack any mechanism to require a State to live up to its commitments,
outside of public reporting of State performance to a United Nations or relevant
international body. For all these reasons, business may avoid accountability because States have not fully implemented their own duties with respect to human
rights. Transnational businesses may also have different obligations depending
on where they operate—at times working in States that do not have the will or
ability to fulfill treaty commitments.
Another category of international laws bearing on business and human rights
is international criminal law for heinous offenses such as genocide,67 war crimes,68
crimes against humanity,69 slavery or forced labor,70 human trafficking,71 and
sexual exploitation of children,72 all of which in certain circumstances can be
committed by non-State actors. Several international treaties explicitly require
States to impose legal liability on “legal persons,” such as business corporations,
for involvement in international crimes.73
However, these “worst of the worst” human rights violations are limited to
the most purposeful and gross violations of human rights. A gold mine or oil
pipeline that poisons the local water supply, for example, may violate the human rights to life, health and clean water, but absent proof of malicious intent—a
difficult element to prove in any case—would not likely rise to the level of one of
these “gross” and criminal violations. Some states have domestic criminal legislation that theoretically permits the prosecution of legal persons for international
67

See section IV.B (5) below.
Id.
69 Id.
70 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, adopted on Sept. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3.
71 G.A. Res. 55/25, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 15, 2000).
72 G.A. Res. 54/263, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale
of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (May 25, 2000).
73 G.A. Res 54/109, International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism
(Dec. 9, 1999). To similar effect are the G.A. Res. 54/263 (May 25, 2000); G.A. Res 55/25, U.N.
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Nov. 15, 2000); Convention Against Corruption art. 26, adopted on Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005);
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 2, adopted on Nov. 21,
1997, DAFFE/IME/BR(97)20, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_
ENG.pdf.
68
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crimes. This has arisen in part because States that are party to the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court agreed to amend their own criminal laws
to allow for prosecutions at the domestic level. A number of these jurisdictions
allow for prosecution of corporations as well as natural persons.74
A new Protocol to the African Court of Justice and Human Rights broadens
the list of international crimes which corporations might commit, and makes
clear that corporations can be criminally liable for these crimes (see section IV.B
(5) below.) But this Protocol has not yet entered into force, its application is
untested, and in any event it will apply only in Africa.
Existing international law, then, is uneven and extremely limited in practice
in its application to business violations of human rights. Nonetheless, it demonstrates that there is no blanket jurisprudential impediment to using international
treaty law to protect human rights from violations or complicity by business.
This is true whether the international law is applied indirectly through States,
or directly to business executives or, where national laws permit,75 directly to
business corporations.76
D

Treaty Options

At this early stage there is a wide range of possibilities for the form and content
of a possible treaty on business and human rights. The mandate of the InterGovernmental Working Group is no more specific than “to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law,
the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”77
The negotiation process could lead to an instrument ranging from a comparatively weak or minimalist treaty, one that would simply mandate public reporting on human rights by large public companies (as recently required in Europe
by the European Union as part of its non-financial reporting rules), to a strong
treaty that provides for both civil and criminal remedies, in both national and
international courts, for human rights violations committed by corporations.78
The global coalition of NGO’s calling for a treaty, as well as the lead governmental sponsor (Ecuador), advocate a treaty that comes closer to the “hard”
end of the spectrum. The November 2013 NGO Joint Statement calls for a treaty
that, among other things, requires States Parties to provide for:
74 Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, ¶ 24–25, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007) (by John Ruggie); see also Anita Ramasastry & Robert C.
Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability
for Grave Breaches of International Law: A Survey of Sixteen Countries 13–15 (2006),
http://biicl.org/files/4364_536.pdf.
75 See section IV.A (5) below.
76 See section V.F below.
77 H.R.C. Res. 26/9, supra note 1, ¶ 1.
78 Council of the European Union Press Release ST 13606/14, New Transparency Rules on Social
Responsibility for Big Companies (Sept. 29, 2014). The new rules will apply only to large publicinterest companies with more than 500 employees and a balance sheet of $25.3 million and higher,
or a net turnover of $50.7 million or more.
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“c)…legal liability for business enterprises for acts or omissions that
infringe human rights;” [and]
“d)…access to an effective remedy by any State concerned, including
access to justice for foreign victims that suffered harm from acts or
omissions of a business enterprise in situations where there are bases
for the States involved to exercise their territorial or extraterritorial
protect- obligations.”79
In addition, the NGO’s call for a treaty that “[p]rovides for an international
monitoring and accountability mechanism.”80
Similarly, Ecuador’s Foreign Minister has written that the proposed treaty
“would move the world to a legal framework that holds transnational corporations accountable for their human rights violations. It will provide legal protections and effective remedies, as well as create an important role for civil society
actors in promoting corporate accountability…”81
On the other hand, it is by no means clear that any treaty that ultimately
emerges from a UN drafting process will meet these objectives. In between the
extremes of a strong treaty and no treaty, there is a wide range of possible outcomes of a drafting process. There is also the possibility that there might be more
than one treaty, or that a treaty or treaties would address specific sectors.82
In this section we do not attempt to catalogue them all; there are simply
too many options. Instead we merely outline illustrative options, each modeled
partly on existing global or regional instruments binding States in regard to human rights or related fields, such as anti-corruption and environmental law.83
Each of these potential templates is either widely ratified or recently adopted.
Thus there is reason to believe that their form, at least, may be generally acceptable to States.
In all these examples, references to “corporations” or “companies” refer to
“transnational corporations and other business enterprises,” the phrase used in
all the Human Rights Council resolutions of the last decade relating to business
and human rights. Key conceptual issues that arise from the various treaty options, including from this very phrase, are addressed in section V, following the
catalogue of illustrative treaty options in this Part IV.
A treaty specifying business responsibilities could either be a new, freestanding instrument, or might be crafted as an additional protocol to an existing treaty
imposing human rights obligations on States.
79 People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business Joint Statement, supra note 44, at ¶ 1c–1d
(emphasis added)
80 Id., ¶ 1e.
81 Ricardo Patiño, Transnational Misconduct Must End, Huffington Post (Oct.
24,
2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/ricardo-patino/ecuador-ricardopatino_b_6040920.html.
82 The Human Rights Council Resolution establishes the Intergovernmental Working Group on
“a” legally binding instrument, for the purpose of elaborating “an” international legally binding
instrument. H.R.C. Res. 26/9, supra note 1, at ¶ 1. Hence it appears that further HRC authority
might be needed for the Working Group to elaborate more than one treaty.
83 For further analysis, see ICJ Report, supra note 32, at 34–43.
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For clarity, our listing is organized in two broad categories: treaties mandating mainly national action (Part A below); and treaties establishing international enforcement machinery (Part B below).84 (A treaty could of course mandate both.) Within each category, the listing proceeds, roughly speaking, from
relatively “weak” to relatively “hard” treaty options.
A third category involves “policy coherence” treaties, by which States would
review and amend their laws and international agreements concerning business
to ensure consistency with the State duty to protect human rights (Part C below).
A final category refers to treaties for particular business sectors or for certain
kinds of human rights violations (Part D below).
Finally, it should be noted that nothing in the UN treaty process precludes
States or regional organizations from proceeding with national or regional laws,
treaties and other initiatives on business and human rights.
D.1 National Action Treaties
D.1.1 Business Reporting
A treaty might simply require all or some corporations to report publicly on their
human rights policies, risks, outcomes and indicators, perhaps using the “comply or explain” approach of some recent reporting regulations. For example,
in October 2014 the European Union issued a Directive requiring some 6000
“public interest” companies in the EU, having more than 500 employees and a
balance sheet of $25.3 million and higher, or a net turnover of $50.7 million or
more annually, to disclose certain “non-financial and diversity information.”85
Public interest companies are publicly listed companies of “significant public
relevance” because of the nature of their business, size or corporate status.86
Under these new rules, large public companies will have to report certain
non-financial information: “as a minimum, environmental, social and employee
matters, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters.” Companies can avoid reporting on one or more of these issues if they do not pursue
policies on those issues and provide a “clear and reasoned” explanation of this
choice.
In addition to a brief description of their business models, companies will
generally be required to report on:
• Policies and Processes: their policies regarding human rights (and related
matters), including their due diligence processes;
84 The NGO Joint Statement on a treaty specifically calls on States to “monitor and regulate”
business enterprises and to provide for their “legal liability” and for an “effective remedy,” but
only generally calls for an undefined “international monitoring and accountability mechanism.” See
People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business Joint Statement, supra note 44, at ¶ 1.
85 Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Oct. 2014 amending
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by Certain
Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, 6.
86 Council of the European Union Press Release ST 13606/14, New Transparency Rules on Social
Responsibility for Big Companies (Sept. 29, 2014).
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• Outcomes: the outcomes of their policies;
• Risks: “the principal risks related to those matters linked to the group’s
operations including, where relevant and proportionate, its business relationships, products or services which are likely to cause adverse impacts
in those areas, and how the group manages those risks;” and
• Indicators: key human rights (and related) “performance indicators” relevant to the company’s business.87
EU member States will be allowed two years to incorporate the requirements of
the Directive into their domestic laws. The methods of enforcement of the EU
reporting obligations and independent verification of corporate reports are left
to member State discretion. As is often true of EU directives, this may create
inconsistencies in the application of these rules, and possibly a lack of “teeth” if
companies fail to comply.
One approach to a UN treaty would be to adopt this existing EU reporting
requirement, or a similar one, for States worldwide which choose to join the UN
treaty, either as the entire UN treaty or as a component of a broader UN treaty.
One advantage of such an approach is that the 28 EU member States, already bound by the reporting requirement, and perhaps the current six EU candidate countries, might readily join a UN treaty obligating them to do what they
are already bound to do. This might encourage wider ratification of the treaty
by other States. A disadvantage, if the UN treaty were to go no further than a
business-reporting requirement, is that it would not meet the stated objectives
of the principal proponents of a treaty, in terms of access to effective remedy
and corporate liability. It would still, however, facilitate a minimum baseline of
information, providing potential transparency and access to information.
D.2 National Planning
The UN Human Rights Council has encouraged all States to adopt National Action Plans to implement the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights.88 To date
only a handful of States have done so, including the United Kingdom, although
another dozen or more are currently in the process of developing Plans,89 including the United States.90 In addition, the UN Working Group on Business
87 Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 Oct. 2014 amending
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by Certain
Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, 6.
88 Human Rights Council Res. 26/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/22, ¶ 2 (June 27, 2014)
89 State National Action Plans, United Nations Human Rights (Oct. 24, 2015, 4:00 PM),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/NationalActionPlans.aspx.
90 U.S. Dep’t of State, USG Nat’l Action Plan on Responsible Bus. Conduct: Frequently Asked
Questions, HumanRights.gov (last updated Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/
2015/usg-national-action-plan-on-responsible-business-conduct/.
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and Human Rights has published detailed guidance on both the content of National Action Plans and the process by which they should be developed.91
In view of the limited number of States that have initiated planning processes
to date, one form of treaty might require all States Parties to do so, and encourage
international cooperation in developing plans and sharing best practices. The
treaty might even require States to adopt, or at least encourage them to take into
account, some or all elements of the Working Group’s Guidance on plans.92 The
Working Group’s Guidance focuses on Pillar I and the State Duty to Protect, and
provides a non-exhaustive list of issues that States should evaluate and act on—
focusing on how States can use a smart mix of voluntary and regulatory measures
to ensure that companies within their jurisdiction respect human rights, and also
that victims have better access to remedies.93 This might constitute either the
entirety of a treaty, or one component of a broader treaty.
One advantage of such an approach would be to make clear that the treaty
will reinforce, rather than detract from, implementation of the UN Guiding Principles. A disadvantage is that, by itself, it would not meet the objectives of the
principal proponents of a treaty, since a focus on National Action Plans emphasizes national activity without international oversight or enforcement, as well as
the potential for divergent approaches to what governments see as a common
baseline for State action on business and human rights.
D.3 Business Implementation of Guiding Principles
A treaty might mandate:
• States to carry out their duties under the UN Guiding Principles to “protect” human rights from violations by business or in which business is involved (“Pillar One” of the Guiding Principles), including with respect to
extraterritorial operations of their businesses, to the extent jurisdictional
bases exist under international law;94
• States to require all businesses, or all businesses above a certain size, to
carry out their responsibility to “respect” human rights through adoption
of human rights policies, due diligence processes, human rights conditions
in their supply chain contracts, and remediation mechanisms (“Pillars One
and Two” of the Guiding Principles); and
• States and business to address their judicial and non-judicial remediation
responsibilities (“Pillar Three” of the Guiding Principles), either through
91 UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, Guidance on National Action Plans
on Business and Human Rights, Version 1.01 (Dec. 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Business/UNWG_%20NAPGuidance.pdf.
92 Id. at 17–36.
93 Id.
94 See section V.D below. The Commentary to Principle 2 of the UN Guiding Principles states:
“At present States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the
extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they
generally prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.” Guiding
Principles, supra note 27, at 7, ¶ 2.
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taking certain specified measures, or through review processes designed to
assure that victims have access to effective remedies.
An advantage of this approach is that it would encourage effective implementation of the UN Guiding Principles, whose basic content is already widely approved (albeit in “soft law” form). This approach is related to the National
Action Plan option outlined above, but goes further in specifying the concrete
actions that States must take to fulfill their treaty obligations. Implementation
might be facilitated by templates for business reporting on implementation of
the Guiding Principles, such as the UN Guiding Principles Reporting Framework recently developed by Shift and Mazars for the Human Rights Reporting
and Assurance Frameworks Initiative (RAFI).95
Some of the same challenges exist, however, as with the prior National Action Plan option. A difficulty is that much of the language of the Guiding Principles, and of their accompanying commentary, is purposefully vague and flexible.
On some points, then, the treaty language would need either to be made more
precise, thereby triggering more extended negotiations and perhaps ultimate rejection, or to be “soft,” requiring States and business, for example, to “take into
account” certain of their obligations and responsibilities, or to demonstrate that
they have given them “due consideration,” even while other obligations (especially State obligations under existing human rights treaties) might be clearly
stated and mandated.
One possible approach for such a treaty would be for States Parties to adopt
mandatory “due diligence” requirements for their companies in regard to their
global supply chains, similar to the bill recently approved by the French National Assembly,96 and as encouraged by a recent resolution of the European
Parliament.97 The French bill, which many observers expect to be enacted into
law in 2015, would make “French companies employing 5,000 employees or
more domestically or 10,000 employees or more internationally…responsible
for developing and publishing due diligence plans for human rights, and environmental and social risks. Failure to do so could result in fines of up to 10
million euros.”98
95 Human Rights Reporting and Assurance Frameworks Initiative, ShiftProject.org,
http://www.shiftproject.org/project/human-rights-reporting-and-assuranceframeworks-initiative-rafi(last updated May 2015).
96 Proposition de Loi no. 501 du 30 mars 2015 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères
et des enterprises donneuses d’ordre [Proposed Law no. 501 of Mar. 30, 2015 relating to the duty of
vigilance of the parent companies and donor companies to order], Assemblée Nationale [National
Assembly of France], http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/ta/ta0501.asp.
97 European Parliament Resolution on the Second Anniversary of the Rana Plaza Building Collapse and Progress of the Bangladesh Sustainability Compact, European Parliament
(2015/2589(RSP)) (last updated Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=P8-RC-2015-0363&language=EN [hereinafter European
Parliament Resolution].
98 Roel Nieuwenkamp, Legislation on Responsible Business Conduct Must Reinforce the Wheel,
Not Reinvent It, OECD: Insights Blog (Apr. 15, 2015), http://oecdinsights.org/2015/
04/15/legislation-on-responsible-business-conduct-must-reinforce-the-wheel-notreinvent-it/. Mr. Nieuwenkamp is Chair of the OED Working Party on Responsible Business
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In a resolution adopted shortly after the French bill, the European Parliament
“consider[ed] that new EU legislation is necessary to create a legal obligation of
due diligence for EU companies outsourcing production to third countries, including measures to secure traceability and transparency, in line with the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the OECD MNE Guidelines.”99 Although this Resolution does not by itself mandate EU due diligence
legislation, it may well lead to such legislation because the OECD Guidelines
on Multinational Enterprises, discussed below, include a component on human
rights due diligence.100
In Switzerland, a bill to mandate due diligence was narrowly defeated in
Parliament, but an effort to mandate a binding public referendum is now underway.101
If a treaty were to commit States Parties to require human rights due diligence
for businesses, or even compliance with all three pillars of the Guiding Principles more generally, consideration might also be given to whether good faith,
demonstrated compliance with the Guiding Principles (or due diligence) might
be deemed a defense to, or at least a proportional mitigation of, criminal or civil
liability. Such a provision could give business a strong incentive to comply with
the Guiding Principles or to exercise due diligence, without depriving victims of
a remedy for serious violations of human rights.
The US Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide a relevant example in the area
of anti-corruption. Courts and the US Department of Justice take certain factors
into consideration when assessing criminal fines for companies prosecuted under
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:102
• whether high-level personnel were involved in or condoned the conduct,
• whether the organization had a pre-existing compliance and ethics program,
• voluntary disclosure,
Conduct. (The quoted language in text above is from his commentary, not from the original French
text of the bill.)
99 European Parliament Resolution, supra note 97, at ¶ 23.
100 Arnaud Poitevin, The EU May Move Towards Mandatory Business & Human
Rights Regulation, Business-HumanRights.org (May 12, 2015), http://businesshumanrights.org/en/eu-parliamentary-motion-calls-for-mandatory-human-rightsdue-diligence-for-companies?utm_source=Business+%26+human+rights+-+Weekly+
Update&utm_campaign=f16079aed2-Weekly_Update_13_May_20155_12_2015&utm_medium=
email&utm_term=0_3a0b8cd0d0-f16079aed2-174128041.
101 The Swiss motion, proposing mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence for Swiss corporations, was defeated by a vote of 95–86. Nieuwenkamp, supra
note 98. In response, the Swiss Coalition for Corporate Justice has begun collecting
signatures for a popular initiative on the same topic. If they gather 100,000 signatures in 18 months, the measure will be put to a binding public referendum. Swiss
Coal. For Corp. Justice, Global Business? Global Responsibility!, Corporate Justice (Apr.
21, 2015, 10:30 CEST), http://www.corporatejustice.ch/media/medialibrary/2015/04/
150421_sccj_press_release_-_launch_of_responsible_business_initiative.pdf.
102 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §8(C)2.5, (1991), http://www.ussc.
gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2010/manual-pdf/Chapter_8.pdf.
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• cooperation, and
• acceptance of responsibility.
United Kingdom anti-bribery law provides an example of due diligence as
defense. The fact that companies took “adequate procedures” to prevent bribery
in their operations is a defense to a charge of a company’s failure to prevent
bribery under the UK Bribery Act of 2010.103
Like the reporting and planning approaches outlined above, this approach
to a treaty has the disadvantage that it does not meet all the objectives of the
principal proponents of a treaty.104 However, if suitable treaty language could be
found, it might be acceptable to a broad range of States as a stand-alone treaty.
Alternatively, it could be one component of a broader treaty.
D.4 Framework Treaty
One way to implement the UN Guiding Principles (or other basic principles on
business and human rights) could be a treaty designed to set in motion an ongoing process of review and elaboration of additional standards over time. That
could be the result of initially adopting a generally worded, “framework” treaty,
committing States Parties only to broad principles, later to be supplemented by
more specified duties, through additional protocols or actions, based on review
of state practice over time.
An example of such an approach is the universally ratified international legal regime on the ozone layer in the atmosphere.105 The regime began with the
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.106 The initial
commitments of States Parties were extremely general and flexible: “to take appropriate measures in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and of
those protocols in force to which they are party…” and to “[c]o-operate in the
formulation of agreed measures, procedures and standards for the implementation of this Convention, with a view to the adoption of protocols and annexes
…”107
As scientific analysis of ozone depletion progressed, the States Parties agreed
to adopt more specific measures in the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances
103 See Peter Wilkinson, Transparency Int’l, The 2010 UK Bribery Act Adequate Procedures 4
(Robert Barrington et al. eds., Transparency Int’l U.K., 2010), http://www.transparency.org.
uk/our-work/business-integrity/bribery-act/adequate-procedures.
104 But it may meet some objectives of some proponents. The Secretary General of
Amnesty International recently wrote, “A treaty should require each state to pass laws to
make corporate human rights due diligence mandatory…” Salil Shetty, Corporations Have
Rights. Now We Need a Global Treaty on Their Responsibilities, Guardian (UK) (Jan. 22,
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/
jan/21/corporations-abuse-rights-international-law.
105 Both the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol enjoy universal ratification (by 197
States Parties). See table at Ozone Secretariat, Treaties and Decisions, http://ozone.unep.org/
en/treaties-and-decisions (last visited, Oct. 26, 2015).
106 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted on Mar. 22, 1985, 1513
U.N.T.S. 293 (entered into force Sept. 22, 1988).
107 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 102, art. 2.
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that Deplete the Ozone Layer.108 In addition, States included in the Montreal
Protocol a “unique adjustment provision”: Parties agreed to respond swiftly to
new scientific information and to accelerate reductions of chemicals covered by
the Convention as needed, by means of adjustments that would be “automatically applicable to all countries that ratified the Protocol.” Since its initial adoption, the Montreal Protocol has thus been modified six times, without the need
to adopt a new treaty or protocol on each occasion.109
The main advantage of initially adopting a “framework” treaty like the Vienna Convention for business and human rights is that it might swiftly secure
broad agreement by States. Its general principles could be taken from the already
widely supported UN Guiding Principles. More difficult or specific issues could
then be deferred to future protocols, without holding up the entire negotiating
process (possibly for years), or limiting the number of Parties to an eventual
treaty to only the most supportive States. The European Convention on Human
Rights, for example, has been supplemented with 15 additional protocols (plus
two more that are pending ratifications), giving rise to new State obligations as
consensus emerged on different human rights.110
Future protocols to a framework business and human rights treaty might
provide for supplemental commitments which States will then be asked to ratify. The treaty might even provide for automatic adjustments, based on review
of experience in implementing the framework principles, whenever agreement
is reached by States Parties, as in the Montreal Protocol. (However, automatic
adjustments of business responsibilities might not be as easily crafted or agreed
as additional restrictions on chemicals affecting the ozone layer.)
The main disadvantage of such a “framework” approach is that it would not
initially be likely to achieve what treaty proponents principally seek: legally enforceable corporate accountability, and access of victims to effective remedies.
Proponents might well doubt whether, after adoption of a framework convention, any future protocols or adjustments would likely be adopted. On the other
hand, early agreement on a framework treaty might create positive momentum
that could ease the way for further negotiations on more challenging issues.
D.5 National Criminalization and International Cooperation
A treaty might specify certain internationally recognized crimes against human
rights, and require States to prosecute corporations and corporate executives
and to cooperate with each other in doing so.
The form of such a treaty could be modeled on the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,111 which has been joined by all 34 OECD member States (including
108

Adopted 16 Sept. 1987, entered into force, 1 Jan. 1989, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
The foregoing information and quoted language are taken from the web site of the UN Environment Programme, Ozone Secretariat, http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_
protocol.php (as of May 19, 2015).
110 See table at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?CM=8&CL=
ENG
111 Signed 17 Sept. 1997, entered into force 15 February 1999.
109
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the US and the UK), as well as seven other States.112 The Convention requires
States to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials, as well as complicity in
such bribery.113 Where State legal systems do not permit criminal prosecutions
of legal persons such as corporations, the Convention requires States Parties to
“ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions, for bribery of foreign
public officials.”114
International cooperation in enforcement is required through mutual legal
assistance, extradition, and cooperation on monitoring through the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (“the OECD Working Group”), composed of experts of States Parties to the Convention.115
The OECD uses two tools—monitoring and peer pressure—to ensure implementation and enforcement of the Convention. The OECD Working Group
examines and evaluates through a rigorous monitoring mechanism a Party’s efforts to live up to its anti-bribery obligations. After the initial assessment of a
State’s legislation for conformity with the Convention, the second phase of the
monitoring process examines the structures in place to enforce the laws.116
The systematic examination and assessment of a State’s performance by peers
result in recommendations for concrete anti-bribery actions by the examined
country. In addition, the Working Group, at its regular meetings, conducts a
“tour de table” exercise as a unique mechanism to report about latest developments, both in legislation and in enforcement actions and to hold States responsible for reporting on their actions to their peers.117
A treaty on business and human rights could similarly require States to criminalize and cooperate in prosecuting corporations and corporate executives who
commit or are complicit in such crimes against human rights as genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, torture, forced labor, and other defined international crimes118 (human trafficking is already the subject of a similar convention).119
112

See OECD, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in
International
Business
Transactions,
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/
oecdantibriberyconvention.htm.
113 Convention, arts. 1.1 and 1.2.
114 Convention, art. 3.2.
115 Convention, arts. 9, 10 and 12.
116 OECD, Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, http://www.oecd.org/
daf/anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm.
117 OECD, OECD Fights Foreign Bribery, accessible at www.oecd.org/corruption.
118 John Ruggie recently suggested that “one obvious focus” for a treaty “would be the worst
of the worst: business involvement in gross human rights abuses, such as genocide, extrajudicial
killings, and slavery, as well as forced and bonded labor.” J. Ruggie, Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice
to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors, Institute for Human Rights and Business, Sept.
9, 2014, note 17, accessible at http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/quo-vadis-unsolicitedadvice-business.html.
119 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15
November 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319, entered into force 25 December 2003 (166 States Parties as of
Feb. 15, 2015).
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An advantage of this approach is that, in the corruption context, its form
has already been accepted, not only by OECD States, but also by most States
through the UN Convention against Corruption (see below). Nor, in a sense,
would the substance be new; many international crimes against human rights
are already defined by international law and widely recognized as such by States.
In those two senses, there would be “nothing new” conceptually about such a
treaty—even though, in practice, domestic criminalization by States of international human rights crimes is currently uneven, while criminal punishment of
business involvement in such crimes is rare, as is the imposition of proportional
civil sanctions against corporations.120
There are also disadvantages to the OECD model as a stand-alone approach.
It would focus on negative sanctions as deterrents, rather than on more positive
and broader forms of preventing human rights abuses. It would also be limited
to serious human rights crimes (referred to by some as “gross” human rights
abuses), rather than to the far broader range of human rights violations that are
often important in the business context (e.g., routine labor rights violations such
as wage theft or unpaid overtime, or failures by States to engage in processes to
secure the free, prior, informed consent of indigenous communities about business projects affecting their lands).121
On the other hand, a treaty whose form is patterned on the OECD Convention need not be a stand-alone approach. It could be incorporated in a broader
treaty. Indeed, in the corruption context, it already has been, as noted in the next
section.
D.6 National Prevention, Sanctions and International Cooperation
The UN Convention against Corruption (“UNCAC”), adopted in 2003 and entered into force in 2005, now has 175 States Parties (including the US and the
UK).122 It not only incorporates the OECD approach described in the previous section, it also has extensive provisions requiring States to seek to prevent
corruption through policies, practices, periodic review, establishment of independent prevention bodies, reporting and international collaboration.123
The form of UNCAC has thus met nearly universal acceptance by States.
More than the text of the OECD Convention, the UN Convention takes both
a preventive and a punitive approach. UNCAC requires the criminalization of
120 See Anita Ramasastry and Robert C. Thompson, Commerce, Crime and Conflict: Legal Remedies for Private Sector Liability for Grave Breaches of International Law: A Survey of Sixteen
Countries (Fafo 2006) (uneven domestic incorporation); Int’l Corporate Accountability Roundtable,
Commerce, Crime, and Human Rights: Closing the Prosecution Gaps, (businesses “rarely” held to
account), accessible at http://icar.ngo/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/CCHR_Concept-NoteCommerce-Crime-and-Human-Rights.pdf.
121 E.g., United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), arts. 19, 29.2
and 32.2; International Labour Organisation Convention No. 169, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention, 27 June 1989, entered into force 5 Sept. 1991, arts. 6, 7.1, 15.2, 16.2, 17.2, 25.2, 27.1,
27.2, and 28.1.
122 Adopted 31 Oct. 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41, entered into force 14 Dec. 2005. See ratification
table at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.
123 Convention, arts. 5, 6, 10, 12 and 14.
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foreign bribery.124 Like the OECD Convention, it covers complicity as well as
direct commission of crimes,125 and requires States to “establish the liability”
of corporations for offenses under the Convention, whether that be criminal
or, in States whose legal systems do not permit criminal prosecution of legal
persons, then “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” civil or administrative
sanctions.126 UNCAC also requires States to provide victims of corruption access
to civil damages.127
UNCAC calls for peer review and also for monitoring of treaty implementation by an Assembly of States Parties.128 These are not as robust, however, as in
the OECD Convention. The OECD Convention serves as a good example of the
possible benefits of civil society participation, as reports and recommendations
are made public, and private sector and civil society play an active role throughout each review phase of the convention’s monitoring mechanism.129 UNCAC
provides for periodic review, but allows States Parties to choose whether to disclose the findings of any evaluation as well as their own self-assessment.130 An
optional clause permits disputes between States over implementation of the UN
Convention to be referred to the International Court of Justice.131
Given the broad acceptance of the UNCAC, one might anticipate broad acceptance of its form as a model for a treaty on business and human rights. Preventive aspects of such a treaty might incorporate reporting requirements and references to the UN Guiding Principles (as discussed above). Controversy might arise
over which international crimes against human rights should be included in the
treaty. Because this form of treaty relies heavily on State implementation—where
the political will or capacity to regulate business interests is often lacking—
proponents of a treaty on business and human rights might object to the lack of
binding international enforcement institutions and procedures.
D.7 National Civil Remedies
In addition to national criminal enforcement as discussed in the preceding two
sections, a treaty could require States to provide civil damages remedies for victims of human rights violations committed by business or in which business is
complicit. National civil damages remedies are mandated, not only by UNCAC
124

Convention, art. 16.
Convention, art. 27.1.
126 Convention, art. 26.
127 Article 35 states: “Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in accordance
with principles of its domestic law, to ensure that entities or persons who have suffered damage as
a result of an act of corruption have the right to initiate legal proceedings against those responsible
for that damage in order to obtain compensation.”
128 Convention, art. 63.
129 See Marie Chêne and Gillian Dell, U4 Expert Answer: Comparative Assessment of Anti Corruption Conventions’ Review Mechanisms, 2 (2008), available at http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/
helpdesk/query.cfm?id=163.
130 Most governments have not made public their self-assessments, which provide the basis for
the review, nor have most governments agreed to publish the full review report online. Only the
executive summary must be published. UNCAC Article 13.
131 Convention, art. 66.
125
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(as noted in the preceding section), but also, for example, by the UN Convention
against Torture, 132 a treaty joined by 158 States Parties (including the US and
the UK).133 The Convention provides, “each State Party shall ensure in its legal
system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full
rehabilitation as possible.”134
There would be important advantages in requiring a national civil damages
remedy in a treaty. In principle, mandating national judicial (or non-judicial)
damages remedies would be consistent with State obligations under Pillar Three
of the Guiding Principles, while responding to demands of the main treaty proponents for remedies and accountability.
A bare mandate of civil remedies, however, is no guarantee that they will be
effective. Experience has shown that theoretical access to justice (civil or criminal) is often thwarted in practice by legal barriers such as corporate veils and
separate legal personality for parents and subsidiaries, limits on jurisdiction, and
statutes of limitations, as well as practical barriers such as the high costs of litigation, the lack of legal aid or litigation funding for victims, and intimidation (or
worse) of victims and witnesses.135 Some (but only some) of these issues are explored in section V below. If a treaty mandating national civil damages remedies
is to be effective in practice, some way to address many of these thorny issues
will have to be considered, either by addressing them in the treaty text, or by
creating some institution or process to address them in future implementation
of the treaty.
D.8 Comprehensive National Protection
As set forth in section III above, general human rights treaties impose wideranging duties on States to protect persons subject to their jurisdiction from human rights violations, including violations committed by third parties. A treaty
on business and human rights could make explicit what is already implicit: that
States must carry out those wide-ranging obligations specifically to protect people from human rights violations in which business is involved.
An advantage of this approach would be breadth of coverage. A disadvantage, however, is the vagueness and ambiguity of the language of general State
obligations to “ensure” respect for human rights. There is an argument, then,
for coupling any such broad language with more specific State or business obli132 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 Dec. 1984, entered into force, 26 June 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
133 See table at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en.
134 Convention, art. 14.1.
135 See generally, e.g., Jennifer Zerk, Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses:
Towards a Fairer and More Effective System of Domestic Law Remedies (2014), accessible
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/
StudyDomesticeLawRemedies.pdf; G. Skinner, R. McCorquodale, and O. De Schutter, The
Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business
(2013).
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gations, ranging from reporting and planning to civil and criminal liability, as
outlined in the preceding sections.
E International Supervision Treaties
E.1

State Reports to an International Body

Twelve UN human rights treaties, several of which are widely ratified, as well
as many ILO labor treaties, require States periodically to report on the progress
they have made and obstacles they encounter in implementing their treaty obligations.136 States submit written reports to committees consisting of experts,
elected in their individual capacities by States Parties, to oversee treaty implementation. Civil society submits “shadow reports” and otherwise engages in the
review process. The expert committees then conduct “constructive dialogue”
with States in public hearings, after which they issue “concluding observations”
expressing concerns and making recommendations.
The reporting process has been plagued by multiple, overlapping and burdensome State reporting obligations; State delays or failures to report; and, even
so, delays and overwhelming burdens on UN treaty committees in reviewing reports.137 On the other hand, the reporting process provides an opportunity for
periodic self-assessment by States, with participation by civil society in a relatively transparent process, and accountability in the form of publicized critiques
and recommendations by expert, collectively independent bodies.
On balance, State reporting might be deemed a useful component of a treaty
on business and human rights. It could be combined with some requirement that
States create and then implement National Action Plans as outlined in section
IV.A.2 above. Reporting could relate to a State’s own progress with respect to
its plans, for example. Any reporting commitment would likely need to be harmonized with other UN treaty reporting procedures.138
E.2 Individual Complaints to an International Treaty Body
Optional clauses or protocols to at least eight core UN human rights treaties
allow individuals to file complaints with the expert treaty bodies against States
which agree to accept the procedure, once the complainants have exhausted domestic remedies or show good cause for failing to do so.139 The number of States
agreeing to individual complaint procedures, while often significant, is generally
136 E.g., ICPR, art. 40.1 (States Parties “undertake to submit reports on the measures they have
adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on the progress made in the enjoyment
of those rights”).
137 See generally, Navanethem Pillay, United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body System: A
Report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, June 2012, accessible at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRTD/Pages/TBStrengthening.aspx.
138 See generally, e.g., UN G.A. Res. 68/268, Strengthening and Enhancing the Effective Functioning of the Human Rights Treaty Body System, UN Doc. A/RES/68/268, 21 April 2014.
139 See
generally
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/\TBPetitions/Pages/
HRTBPetitions.aspx.
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far fewer than the number of States Parties to the treaty. For example, whereas
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has 168 States Parties,140 its First Optional Protocol, establishing its individual complaint procedure, has only 115 States Parties.141
The complaints are generally processed with little transparency, without independent investigations by the committees, and without public or evidentiary
hearings. They result in “observations” from the treaty bodies which many States
regard as not legally binding, and which often yield no or only partial compliance.
Nonetheless human rights NGOs have waged campaigns to establish individual complaint procedures for treaties that did not originally allow them. The
written complaint procedure may be far less expensive than full-blown judicial
litigation; it may result in published committee findings that place pressure on
States to provide relief to the victim and not infrequently lead to a constructive
response; it may develop jurisprudence; and it may be used to bring illustrative
cases exemplifying broader patterns of abuse by States.
In negotiating situations where large numbers of States are willing to accept
normative and reporting obligations, but only smaller numbers are willing to
accept individual complaint procedures, the optional mechanism allows a way
to maximize the number of States Parties to the main treaty, while also creating
an individual complaints procedure for those States willing (now or in the future)
to accept them.
Especially if States are resistant to a treaty requiring some form of complaints
procedure resulting in legally binding rulings, as in adjudication, arbitration or
administrative decision, a non-binding mechanism may be better than no individual complaint mechanism at all. It may also provide a way to overcome
the barriers of expense and inequality of arms that may make adjudication or
arbitration difficult for victims to pursue in practice.
A threshold question is whether such a procedure would allow individual
complaints to be filed against States, companies, or both. The answer might
depend on the nature of the underlying substantive obligations imposed by the
treaty, and on whether they mandate conduct by States, companies, or both.142
OECD member States have already agreed to one form of complaint procedure, established as part of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.143 The OECD Guidelines are recommendations from governments to
multinational enterprises operating in or from countries that are signatory to
the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises in140 See table at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=IV~4&
chapter=4&lang=en.
141 See table at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en.
142 In the context of individual complaints against States, human rights treaty bodies already address many human rights violations involving business. See ESCR-Net, Global Economy, Global
Rights: A Practitioner’s Guide for Interpreting Human Rights Obligations in the Global Economy
(2014). However, any resulting remedies are formally only against States, which may or may not
implement them with regard to any businesses involved.
143 The Guidelines are accessible at http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/.
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cluding the Guidelines. The OECD Guidelines provide guidance for responsible business conduct in areas such as: labor rights, human rights, environment,
combating bribery, consumer protection competition, taxation, and intellectual
property rights.
While the Guidelines are not legally binding on companies, OECD and signatory governments are required to ensure that they are implemented and observed.
What distinguishes the OECD Guidelines from some other corporate responsibility instruments and mechanisms is their transnational nature, the fact that
they are government-backed standards and that they have a dispute resolution
mechanism for resolving conflicts regarding alleged corporate misconduct.
Governments that adhere to the Guidelines must establish a National Contact Point (“NCP”) to handle complaints against companies that have allegedly
failed to adhere to Guidelines’ standards.144 The ‘specific instance’ procedure—
as the Guidelines’ complaint process is officially called—is meant to resolve
disputes, primarily through mediation and conciliation, but also through other
means. The dispute resolution procedure can be used by anyone who can demonstrate an “interest” (broadly defined) in the alleged violation.
Non-governmental organizations and trade unions from around the world
have used the specific instance process to address adverse human rights impacts
caused by alleged corporate misconduct. The OECD NCP system is one model of
dispute resolution that could be expanded or used as a model for further consideration. It should be noted, however, that the effectiveness of NCP procedures
varies among countries, and that some civil society actors have been sharply
critical of NCP procedures as uneven and often ineffective.145

E.3 International Civil Adjudication
There are no UN or other global courts where victims of human rights violations can sue States for declaratory judgments and reparations. However, at the
regional level, there are at least three such institutions: the European Court of
Human Rights, which can issue legally binding judgments in human rights cases
against all forty-seven member States of the Council of Europe;146 the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, which can issue legally binding judgments
against the twenty OAS member States that accept its contentious jurisdiction;147
and the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, which can issue legally
binding judgments against the twenty-seven African States Parties to the Protocol establishing the Court.148 (Human rights complaints can also be brought
144

The NCP procedures are accessible at http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/ncps/.
E.g., OECD Watch, Assessment of NCP Performance in the 2013-2014 Implementation Cycle,
June 2014, accessible at http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication_3962.
146 See table at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeTableauCourt.asp?MA=
3&CM=16&CL=ENG for Council of Europe treaty CETS No. 5.
147 Int.Am.Ct.H.Rts., Annual Report 2013, p. 5, accessible at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/
sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2013.pdf.
148 See table at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/achpr_1.pdf.
145
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against States before some courts at the sub-regional level.)149
The jurisdiction of such international courts is generally considered subsidiary to that of national courts; cases may not be brought before the international courts until after remedies before national courts are exhausted or good
reason is shown for not doing so.150 The remedies they afford may vary. The
Inter-American Court provides the widest range of reparations, including restitution where feasible; money damages for material and moral injuries; rehabilitation; satisfaction, including symbolic reparations such as naming of memorials and public apologies by high State officials; and guarantees of non-repetition,
such as new laws and training programs for State officials and security forces.151
To the extent States fail to carry out their duty to protect people from business, they may already be sued before regional human rights courts. However,
not all States are parties to regional or sub-regional courts with competence to
hear human rights cases. An international court on business and human rights
might not only fill that gap, but could also permit suits against companies.
Where justice in the form of civil remedies is not available before the relevant national courts—which might be the courts of either the home State or the
host State in the case of transnational corporations—an international court on
business and human rights could thus, in theory, ensure the legal liability and
access to civil justice which are among the demands of the civil society Joint
Statement.152 On the other hand, a significant number of States, including major home States of transnational corporations such as the US, UK and China,
are likely to resist a treaty exposing their companies to suit for money damages
in an international court, even if a treaty included procedural safeguards which
would likely be prerequisites to creation of such a court.
Predominantly host countries of transnational investment might well agree
to join a treaty creating such an international tribunal, and could confer jurisdiction on the tribunal, at least with respect to subsidiaries or other activities
of transnational corporations operating in their territories. Whether they could
confer jurisdiction on the parent companies of such subsidiaries, however, is a
separate question.
A bevy of practical questions would be important for accessibility and efficacy of such an international tribunal. For example: What resources would it
have? How would it be funded? How many cases could it hear? Could claims
be aggregated? What remedies could it order? How would victims’ litigation
149 E.g., Court of Justice of the European Union; see generally http://europa.eu/about-eu/
institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm; Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (see note 150 below).
150 The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is an exception. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
is not required before filing cases in that Court. Koraou v. Niger, Judgment ECW/CCJ/APP/0808,
27 Oct. 2008, ¶¶ 36–53.
151 See generally D. Cassel, The Expanding Scope and Impact of Reparations Awarded by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, in Out of the Ashes: Reparations for Gross Violations of
Human Rights, K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt and P. Lemmens eds. (Intersentia 2005),
pp. 191–223.
152 See People’s Forum on Human Rights and Business, supra note 44.
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costs—let alone a semblance of equality of arms with wealthy corporate defendants—
be assured?
The answers will not come easily. Yet if such issues are not tackled (whether in
a treaty or in the statute or rules of the court), and victims seeking civil damages
are left to the vagaries of national courts, justice may remain elusive. And even
if workable answers are found, they still might not reach companies domiciled
in States which decline to join the treaty.
E.4 International Mediation and Arbitration
Thousands of bilateral and multilateral investment and trade treaties currently
allow foreign corporations to sue host States, before international arbitral tribunals, for alleged breaches of stabilization clauses, regulatory takings, denials
of justice, and other claims arising from State efforts to protect public health,
the environment and worker rights in their territories.153 Those same treaties do
not, however, allow victims of any resulting human rights, consumer, worker or
environmental violations to sue or countersue the foreign corporations before
the arbitral tribunals for endangering their lives, health or livelihoods.
Recently a team of practitioners and scholars has circulated several drafts
of a proposal to, in effect, redress this imbalance, by permitting victims of human rights violations in which companies are involved to bring the companies
before an international arbitral tribunal on business and human rights.154 Binding arbitration might be preceded by voluntary mediation. The arbitral tribunal
might be created, and its use mandated or encouraged, by one or more of a variety of means, including voluntary agreements, incorporation into the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, conditions in supply chain contracts or in bank loans, and
regulatory requirements.155
One means of establishing or utilizing the tribunal would be to provide for
or recognize it in a treaty on business and human rights. A treaty might, for
example, mandate States Parties to require businesses in certain circumstances
to accept its jurisdiction. As opposed to lawsuits for damages before an international court, an arbitral proceeding might have the advantage of speedier and
more streamlined procedures, and potential enforceability of its arbitral awards
before the courts of nearly all nations under the New York Arbitration Convention.156 If no international court is agreed to in a treaty, an arbitral tribunal,
153 See generally Public Citizen, Case Studies: Investor-State Attacks on Public Interest Policies (2014), accessible at http://www.citizen.org/documents/egregious-investor-stateattacks-case-studies.pdf.
154 Claes Cronstedt and Robert Thompson et al., An International Arbitration Tribunal on Business and Human Rights, Version 5, April 13, 2015, accessible at http://www.l4bb.org/news/
TribunalV5B.pdf. One of the authors of this White Paper has been a commentator on the drafts.
Id., Appendix A at 21.
155 See generally http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=363.
156 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June
1958, entered into force 7 June 1959, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. Some 152 States are parties to the Convention, including all major commercial States. See list at http://www.newyorkconvention.
org/contracting-states/list-of-contracting-states,andupdateathttp://www.
newyorkconvention.org/.
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unlike individual complaint procedures before a treaty body, would have the
advantage of being empowered to issue a legally binding award with potentially
broad enforceability throughout the world. To the extent national justice systems
remain beset by barriers to access and to fair adjudication, an arbitral tribunal
might provide a workable alternative.
Many issues remain. For example: How would the tribunal be funded? How
would victims’ litigation costs be funded? In view of the controversial track
record of investor-State arbitration in matters affecting human rights, would victims and their advocates be willing to use even a tribunal where they would have
standing? How would arbitrators be found with the necessary expertise, credibility and objectivity in matters of business and human rights, particularly with
respect to the specific concerns of communities and populations affected by corporate conduct? How public would be the arbitral proceedings and awards?157
Arbitration, as with transnational civil litigation, can also be lengthy and protracted. In some jurisdictions, citizens or claimants are never allowed to waive
or relinquish their right to court in any type of contract signed before a dispute
arises. Even if claimants may have a choice at the outset, a question remains of
whether a consent to arbitrate will lead to a complete ban on future litigation.
The larger question is whether the model of investor-style international arbitration will be suitable to meet the needs of individual claimants or communities
who seek redress for ongoing harms and need swift injunctive relief as opposed
to damages and findings.
These and other questions are being addressed by the authors of the draft
proposal through consultations with diverse stakeholders. While many of these
questions might better be addressed in the rules of an arbitral tribunal, a drafting
process for a treaty on business and human rights might take them into account.
E.5

International Criminal Prosecution

Corporate executives have been prosecuted by international courts since Nuremberg.158 For example, two executives of the German company that sold gas to
the Nazi gas chambers were prosecuted by a British military occupation tribunal,
157 One widely used set of rules for international arbitrations are the Rules of UNCITRAL, the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Effective in 2014, UNCITRAL adopted
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration. These new rules could also potentially be used or adapted for arbitrations on business and human rights. They presumptively provide
that most written aspects of the proceedings will be made public. These include the notice of arbitration and response; statements of claim and defense; any further written statements or submissions
by either party; expert reports and witness statements; a list of exhibits (but not necessarily the exhibits themselves); written submissions by third parties; transcripts of hearings where available; and
any orders, decisions or awards by the tribunal. The Rules permit tribunals to accept third party
submissions, and presumptively provide that evidentiary hearings and oral arguments shall be public. The new Rules are accessible at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/
arbitration/2014Transparency.html. See also United Nations Convention on Transparency in
Treaty-Based Investor Arbitration, adopted 10 Dec. 2014, UNGA Res. 69/116, Annex, art. 2, not
yet in force.
158 See generally Matthew Lippmann, War Crimes Trials of German Industrialists…, 9 Temple
Int’l & Comp. L. J. 173 (1995).
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convicted and sentenced to death.159 Japanese mining officials were also prosecuted by a British military occupation tribunal in the Far East.160 Although corporations were not formally prosecuted at Nuremberg, their assets were seized
and they were put out of business for violating international law.161
More recently the special international criminal tribunal for Lebanon has
gone beyond merely prosecuting individuals, ruling that corporate defendants
can be convicted for criminal contempt of court, while a new Protocol to the
African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (discussed below), once
it enters into force, authorizes criminal prosecutions of corporations for a range
of international crimes.162
Currently there are at least two models for international criminal prosecutions of gross violations of human rights involving business. One is the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) in The Hague.163 The ICC can prosecute
only natural persons164 —including business executives—for a limited range of
crimes, namely genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.165 In cases
involving business and human rights, this model might be followed, either by
adding a second chamber to the ICC, or by broadening the ICC’s jurisdiction to
include legal as well as natural persons, or by creating a separate international
criminal court specifically for crimes committed by business or in which business
is complicit.166
An alternative model has recently been provided by a 2014 Protocol, not yet
in force, to the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights.167 The
Protocol allows international criminal prosecution, not only of individuals, but
also of corporations. A provision on “Corporate Criminal Liability” resolves
several issues of attribution of crimes to corporations, as follows:
159

Id., text at notes 79–86.
Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: From Nuremberg to Rangoon-An Examination of
Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of Multinational Corporations 91 Berkeley
J. Int’l L. 20 (2002).
161 See generally Amicus Brief of Nuremberg Scholars, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, U.S.
S. Ct. No. 10-1491, Dec. 21, 2011, accessible at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/10-1491_petitioner_amcu_nuremberg_
bartov_etal.authcheckdam.pdf.
162 Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Appeals Panel, Case No. STL-14-05/PT/AP/AR126.1, Case
against New TV S.A.L. Karma Mohamed Tahsin al Khayat, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Personal Jurisdiction in Contempt Proceedings, 2 Oct. 2014, ¶¶ 33–74.
163 See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, entered into
force, 1 July 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
164 Id. at art. 25.1.
165 Id. at arts. 5, 6, 7 and 8.
166 Article 25.1 of the ICC Statute currently provides, “The Court shall have jurisdiction over
natural persons pursuant to this Statute.” As a first step, Article 25.1 could be amended simply
by adding the words “and legal” after the word “natural.” The rest of the text would need to be
reviewed to make any corresponding modifications. However, the process of amending the ICC
Statute is difficult, requiring a high degree of consensus. See ICC Statute arts. 121–23.
167 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and
Human Rights, 27 June 2014, accessible at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/
PROTOCOL%20ON%20AMENDMENTS%20TO%20THE%20PROTOCOL%20ON%20THE%20AFRICAN%20COURT%
20-%20EN_0.pdf.
160
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1. “…[T]he Court shall have jurisdiction over legal persons, with the exception of States.”
2. “Corporate intention to commit an offence may be established by proof
that it was the policy of the corporation to do the act which constituted
the offence.”
3. “A policy may be attributed to a corporation where it provides the most
reasonable explanation of the conduct of that corporation.”
4. “Corporate knowledge of the commission of an offence may be established
by proof that the actual or constructive knowledge of the relevant information was possessed within the corporation.”
5. “Knowledge may be possessed within a corporation even though the relevant information is divided between corporate personnel.”
6. “The criminal responsibility of legal persons shall not exclude the criminal
responsibility of natural persons who are perpetrators or accomplices in
the same crimes.”168
The Protocol grants the African Court jurisdiction over a broad range of crimes,
including several which businesses might well commit. In addition to ICC crimes,
the African Court will have jurisdiction over, among other crimes, mercenarism,
corruption, money laundering, trafficking in persons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, and illicit exploitation of natural resources.169
A significant disadvantage of the African Protocol is that, unlike the ICC
Statute which disallows official immunity,170 the African Protocol grants immunity from prosecution before the African Court to “any serving AU Head of State
or Government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other
senior state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.”171
Especially in cases where corporations or corporate executives may be accused
of acting in complicity with “senior state officials,” objections might be raised
to prosecuting the accomplices, but not the principal perpetrators.
A treaty, of course, need not copy either the ICC or the African Protocol
model wholesale. For example, the African Protocol could be used as a model
for an international criminal tribunal on business and human rights, but without
its provision immunizing senior state officials.
E.6

Comprehensive treaty

The foregoing potential elements of a treaty on business and human rights are
not mutually exclusive. A treaty could combine some or all of these elements, and
others besides. The more elements are included, the more effective a treaty might
168
169
170
171

Id. art. 22, adding art. 46C.
Id. art. 28A.1.
ICC Statute, art. 27.
African Protocol, art. 22, adding art. 46A.
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be in ensuring business respect for human rights, and in providing remedies for
any violations. On the other hand, the more ambitious the treaty content, the
more difficult it may become to negotiate and to attract a wide range and large
number of States to join the treaty, especially home States of major transnational
corporations, and to appeal to the businesses which often significantly influence
State positions. Where the fault lines may be, and where the trade-off’s might be
found, are matters that may best emerge from a process of dialogue and consultations. In addition to the inter-governmental process soon to begin at the UN,
a global civil society process of consultation has also recently begun.172
F Policy Coherence Treaties
F.1 National Laws
UN Guiding Principle 8 calls on States to ensure that their institutions that
“shape business practices are aware of and observe the State’s human rights obligations when fulfilling their respective mandates, …” Examples of State institutions cited by the Commentary include those responsible for “corporate law and
securities regulation, investment, export credit and insurance, trade and labour.”
Others might include professional codes regulating the legal profession.173
It would be a tall order for a global treaty to attempt a comprehensive review
and reform of national legislation and regulation in all of these areas. But agreement might be pursued in particular areas. For example, in regard to corporate
law, to what extent ought parent companies to be responsible for the human
rights impacts of their subsidiaries, including their subsidiaries abroad?174 In regard to public procurement, States might pursue agreement on common human
rights standards and due diligence processes.175
F.2 International Agreements
UN Guiding Principle 9 provides that “States should maintain adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing businessrelated policy objectives with other States or business enterprises, for instance
through investment treaties or contracts.” The Commentary points out that the
terms of “bilateral investment treaties, free-trade agreements or contracts for investment projects…may constrain States from fully implementing new human
rights legislation, or put them at risk of binding international arbitration if they
do so…States should ensure that they retain adequate policy and regulatory abil172 FIDH and ESCR-Net New Joint “Treaty Initiative,” Jan. 30, 2015, accessible at
https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/globalisationhuman-rights/business-and-human-rights/16868-fidh-and-escr-net-new-jointtreaty-initiative.
173 See section V.G. below.
174 See section V.E. below.
175 See, e.g., Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/28, 28 April 2015, ¶¶ 40–42.
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ity to protect human rights under the terms of such agreements, while providing
the necessary investor protection.”
States might agree, for example, to include human rights protections in future
investment and trade treaties.176 They could also agree to treat them as terms
of existing treaties, in cases where both States to a dispute are Parties to the
new agreement, or otherwise agree to apply the new provisions in an existing
treaty.177
F.3 Sectoral Treaties178
The foregoing sections catalogue, illustratively but not exhaustively, various
ways that a treaty might address business with regard to human rights generally.
It would also be possible to adopt a narrower treaty, focusing on a particular
sector such as the extractives or information communications technology (ICT)
sectors, or on the business role in regard to particular kinds of human rights
abuses. Advantages of a narrower approach might include greater ease of adoption and ratification, because fewer technical legal issues might have to be resolved, and diplomatic consensus might be more readily reached. Disadvantages
would include incompleteness of coverage, as well as potentially burdensome
selectivity in regard to a particular industry. This, in turn, could adversely affect
the interests of some States more than others.
G

Selected Key Issues

In deciding among and fleshing out treaty options, a number of cross-cutting
issues will need to be considered. The following issues are not a comprehensive
list, but are among the most prominent and contentious. They include:
• What companies are to be regulated—transnational corporations, large
corporations, or all corporations? What will be the responsibility of Stateowned enterprises?
176 See generally Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises, UN Doc. A/HRC/29/28, 28 April 2015, ¶¶ 18–28 (investment), 29–31 (international investment agreements and dispute settlement), 32–35 (transparency
in international arbitration) and 36–39 (trade agreements and trade-related issues).
177 For examples of new treaties adding terms to existing treaties, see, e.g., United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor Arbitration, adopted 10 Dec. 2014, UNGA Res.
69/116, Annex, art. 2, not yet in force; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 Dec. 1984, entered into force, 26 June 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85, art. 8 (Torture offenses “shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offenses in any extradition
treaty existing between States Parties.”).
178 The Human Rights Council Resolution establishes the Intergovernmental Working Group on
“a” legally binding instrument, for the purpose of elaborating “an” international legally binding
instrument. UN HRC Res. 26/9, 26 June 2014, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights,
¶ 1. Hence it appears that further HRC authority might be needed for the Working Group to elaborate more than one treaty.
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• What human rights norms will the treaty enforce against business—jus
cogens, customary international law, human rights treaties in States that
are parties to those treaties, or the norms specified by the UN Guiding
Principles (the International Bill of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration of
Fundamental Labor Rights, plus others in context)?
• What substantive norms will the treaty impose for civil damages claims—
international human rights law or domestic tort/delict standards? Will the
treaty defer to international, regional or national legal standards for concepts such as complicity, or refer instead to general principles of law?
• Extraterritorial jurisdiction: Will States be expressly authorized or required
to exercise jurisdiction over human rights violations committed outside
their territories by companies domiciled in the State?
• What is the scope of corporate responsibility: In what circumstances will
parent companies be liable for wrongs committed by subsidiaries, and vice
versa?
• Duty bearers: Will the treaty impose direct obligations only on States, or
will it impose direct obligations on business as well?
• Lawyers and business advisors: Will the treaty ensure policy coherence
between their human rights responsibilities and their professional codes of
conduct and ethics?
The following sections address these topics in sequence:
G.1 What companies are to be regulated—
transnational corporations, large corporations, or all
corporations?
The recurrent heading of UN Human Rights Council resolutions on business
and human rights has been “transnational corporations and other business enterprises” (emphasis added). The Guiding Principles explicitly apply to “all”
business enterprises:
The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights
applies to all enterprises regardless of their size, sector, operational
context, ownership and structure. Nevertheless, the scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet that responsibility may vary according to these factors and with the severity of
the enterprise’s adverse human rights impacts.179
Yet as noted above, even though the Council’s June 2014 resolution initiating the
treaty process repeats the phrase, “transnational corporations and other business
enterprises,” a footnote in the preamble defines “other business enterprises” to
179

UN Guiding Principle 14.
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include only those which have a “transnational character in their operational
activities.” The footnote expressly excludes “local businesses registered in terms
of relevant domestic law.”180
This ambivalent narrowing of scope—from all business enterprises to only
transnational corporations—has been widely criticized, by both States and civil
society, as disfiguring the business and human rights agenda. Ruggie’s critique is
illustrative:
A footnote defines ‘other business enterprises’ in a way that is intended to exclude national companies. Thus…the proposed treaty
would have covered international brands purchasing garments from
the factories…in the collapsed Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh,
but not the local factory owners…employing the more than 1,100
workers who died…
The core sponsors of the resolution may have found this formulation
to be useful in putting together their voting coalition. But it poses
two enormous impediments to future progress. First, an exclusive
focus on transnational corporations has always triggered strong opposition from their home countries, …as well as from international
business. …[I]t has also dampened the enthusiasm of civil society
organizations for the initiative. …because for victims the corporate
form of the abuser is irrelevant.
Second, the definition of ‘other business enterprises’ …makes no
sense either in logical or legal terms. …[T]here is no meaningful distinction between ‘transnational corporations’ and ‘enterprises that
have a transnational character.’ …More importantly, transnational
corporations’ subsidiaries are typically required to incorporate under ‘relevant domestic law,’ often in joint ventures, including with
state-owned enterprises or …local businesses. …How do all these
structures and relationships get disentangled?181
Given the breadth of opposition to excluding national corporations from the
treaty, this issue is likely to be raised during the negotiations. (This is a distinct
issue from whether specific types of companies (e.g., Small and Medium Enterprises (“SME’s”), or State owned enterprises) would be exempt from specific
treaty requirements, or might be given a different timeline or scope of compliance with obligations.)
G.2 What human rights norms will the treaty enforce against
business—
180 UN HRC Res. 26/9, 26 June 2014, Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument
on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, par. 9.
UN HRC Res. 26/9, 26 June 2014; id. at note 1.
181 John Ruggie, Quo Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors, Sept. 9, 2014, Institute for Human Rights and Business, accessible at http://www.ihrb.org/
commentary/quo-vadis-unsolicited-advice-business.html.
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jus cogens, customary international law, human rights treaties in
States Parties to those treaties, or the norms specified by the UN
Guiding Principles (the International Bill of Human Rights, the ILO
Declaration of Fundamental Labor Rights, plus others in context)?
The range of human rights covered by the treaty may depend on the kinds of duties imposed by the treaty, or even by particular provisions of the treaty. To the
extent the treaty focuses on reporting, planning, or implementing the Guiding
Principles, it should cover a broad range of rights. As John Ruggie concluded
after analyzing more than 300 reports of alleged corporate abuses, “there are
few if any internationally recognized rights business cannot impact—or be perceived to impact—in some manner. Therefore, companies should consider all
such rights.”182 Hence the Commentary to Guiding Principle 12 enjoins:
Because business enterprises can have an impact on virtually the entire spectrum of internationally recognized human rights, their responsibility to respect applies to all such rights. In practice, some
human rights may be at greater risk than others in particular industries or contexts, and therefore will be the focus of heightened attention. However, situations may change, so all human rights should be
the subject of periodic review.
Guiding Principle 12 recognizes the business responsibility to respect, at minimum, all rights articulated in the International Bill of Human Rights and the
ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.183 The International Bill of Human Rights includes the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,184 the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,185 and
the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.186
Together these three instruments cover a broad range of rights. The ILO Declaration addresses specific workplace rights: freedom of association, prohibitions
on child labor and forced labor, and non-discrimination.
These constitute the minimum catalogue of rights for purposes of human
rights due diligence. In addition, the Commentary to Guiding Principle 12 explains:
Depending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to consider additional standards. For instance,…[UN] instruments have
elaborated further on the rights of indigenous peoples; women; national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities; children; persons
with disabilities; and migrant workers and their families. Moreover,
182 John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights,
UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, ¶ 52.
183 The Declaration, together with an explanatory report, is accessible at http://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_
176149.pdf.
184 10 December 1948, accessible at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
185 Adopted, 16 December 1966, entered into force, 23 March 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 171.
186 Adopted, 16 December 1966, entered into force, 3 Jan. 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
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in situations of armed conflict enterprises should respect the standards of international humanitarian law.

For treaties focused on reporting, planning, or implementation of the Guiding
Principles, then, the coverage of rights should be very broad. On the other hand,
to the extent a treaty establishes an individual complaint procedure, or provides for civil damages remedies, the list of human rights that can be invoked
through such procedures might be narrowed to the kinds of rights—still a broad
list—reasonably “justiciable” in similar proceedings against States.187 Such an
adjustment would have to be undertaken with care, because even rights that
might appear less compelling in other contexts (e.g., the right to leisure) can be
serious in a business context where workers can be subjected to long hours with
little or no rest.
Finally, to the extent a treaty imposes criminal sanctions, it would apply,
not to all human rights violations, but only to violations caused by the commission of an existing international crime,188 or conceivably by a new international
crime recognized and defined by the treaty, or by a national crime that affects human rights.189 If criminal prosecution were the only approach adopted, it would
exclude most human rights infringements by business.
A single treaty could of course employ different menus of rights: a full range
for planning provisions, a somewhat narrower range for civil complaints, and a
much narrower range for criminal prosecutions.
G.3 What substantive norms will the treaty impose for civil damages
claims—
international human rights law, or common law tort standards or,
in civil law countries, the civil law equivalent? Will the treaty
defer to national legal standards for concepts such as complicity
or refer to general principles of international law?
A number of suits for money damages have been brought in English courts
against British companies for human rights violations committed in other countries based, not on international human rights law, but on common law tort
theories such as trespass and negligence. Several settlements have resulted.190
187

See sections IV.A.7, IV.B.2, and IV.B.3 above.
See section IV.B.5 above.
189 The Statutes of some international criminal tribunals allow for the prosecution of
certain national as well as international crimes. E.g., the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, art. 2.1 (a), grants the Tribunal jurisdiction over “[t]he provisions of
the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to…terrorism, crimes and offences against life and
personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and offences,…” (Accessible at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/documents/un-documents/un-security-councilresolutions/security-council-resolution-1757.) Likewise Article 5 of the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone granted the Court jurisdiction over “crimes under Sierra Leonean law,”
including abuse or abduction of girl children and arson. (Accessible at http://www.rscsl.org/
Documents/scsl-statute.pdf.)
190 See generally Richard Meeran, Tort Litigation against Multinational Corporations for Violation of Human Rights: An Overview of the Position Outside the United States, 3 City Univ. Hong
Kong L. Rev. 1 (2011).
188
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Following the decision of the US Supreme Court in 2013 in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum,191 which narrowed jurisdiction over human rights suits under the federal Alien Tort Statute, suggestions have been made to seek damages
for overseas human rights violations by filing common law tort suits in US state
courts.192 Plaintiffs are now bringing common law tort claims in Canada with
respect to the conduct of extractive companies overseas.193
It has been argued that, if a civil damages remedy in national courts is permitted or required by a treaty, it could be more effective in practice, at least in
common law countries, if it were based on reasonably well-understood common
law torts, with which common law judges are already familiar and comfortable,
than on novel definitions of damages actions based directly on international human rights law.194 In effect it is argued that, since common law tort actions have
succeeded in practice, Why argue with success?
On the other hand, even where they result in payment of money damages,
common law tort actions may not do justice to the gravity of the invasion of
human dignity occasioned by gross violations of human rights. They may also
be frustrated by procedural obstacles under national laws, such as short statutes
of limitations, that should not apply to treaty-based actions for serious human
rights violations.195 In addition, civil remedies for violations of human rights
may also be more congruent than common law torts with a comprehensive treaty
enforcing international human rights law, and more uniform among potential
States Parties with varying legal traditions (e.g., common law, civil law, Islamic
law). And even with tort law as a basis for redress, the legal standards for what
gives rise to liability (e.g., claims of negligence, intentional torts, standards for
accomplice liability, etc., may vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.)
This is an issue treaty drafters may wish to consider. One potential solution might be for a treaty to contemplate both kinds of remedies—human rights
suits and national tort suits (or other national damages remedies)—as vehicles
to secure civil justice for victims of business violations of human rights.196
191

133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
E.g., Roger Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation after Kiobel, 89 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1749 (2014).
193 Susana C. Mijares Peña, Human Rights Violations by Canadian Companies Abroad: Choc
v Hudbay Minerals Inc., 5 UWO J. Leg. Stud. 3 (2014), accessible at http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/
uwojls/vol5/iss1/3>.
194 See Meeran, supra note 190, at 24 (“This approach of invoking tort law involves allegations
of negligence rather than human rights violations, which could be regarded as diminishing the significance of the harm, but on the other hand has the advantages of simplicity and being potentially
applicable to fundamental human rights violations as well as violations of socio-economic rights…”)
195 E.g., Int.Am.Ct.H.Rts., Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment of March 14, 2001, Series C, No. 75,
¶ 41 (“provisions on prescription,” i.e., statutes of limitations); Basic Principles on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation…, UNGA Res. 60/147. UN Doc. A/RES/60/147, 21 March 2006, Annex,
¶¶ 6–7 (re statutes of limitations).
196 For a discussion of the varying ways States have incorporated the right of victims to seek
a remedy for human rights abuses committed by natural persons, see Beth Stephens, Translating
Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International
Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2002), accessible at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2125469.
192
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G.4 Extraterritorial jurisdiction: Will States be expressly authorized or
required to exercise jurisdiction over human rights violations
committed outside their territories by companies domiciled in
the State?
Where a host State is unwilling or unable to provide victims access to effective
remedies for human rights violations by a foreign company operating in its territory, should the treaty require the company’s home State to exercise jurisdiction?
If the answer is “no,” then victims may continue to be deprived of effective remedies. Even if an international tribunal on business and human rights were to be
established, history teaches that most international courts have limited resources
and can hear only a relatively limited number of cases.197 National justice cannot
be abandoned altogether.
Guiding Principle 2 does not quite answer the question of a home State’s
extraterritorial jurisdiction: It provides that “States should set out clearly the
expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction respect human rights throughout their operations.” But must States
embody this extraterritorial “expectation” in law and practice?
The Commentary is more specific, taking the view that extraterritorial jurisdiction is permissive, but not mandatory:
At present States are not generally required under international human rights law to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction. Nor are they generally prohibited from doing so, provided there is a recognized jurisdictional basis.
The Commentary to Guiding Principle 2 does recognize that “some human rights
treaty bodies recommend that home States take steps to prevent abuse abroad
by business enterprises within their jurisdiction.” Increasingly, however, the International Court of Justice,198 global and regional human rights treaty bodies,
and UN thematic experts interpret human rights treaties not merely to permit,
but to impose extraterritorial obligations, including with regard to regulation of
business activities abroad.199
There is no doubt that States have the right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over their own companies. In the United States Supreme Court litigation
197 An arguable exception is the European Court of Human Rights, which has 47 full-time judges
and an annual budget of nearly $90 million. To the extent the UN, or the States Parties to a treaty,
were willing to provide that level of human and financial resources, an international court on business
and human rights could take on more of the burden of justice. (The European Court’s 2013 budget of 66.8 million euros is accessible at http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/
howitworks&c=#newComponent_1346157778000_pointer. At the June 24, 2013 exchange rate of
one euro = $1.31, that amounted to $86.7 million.)
198 ICJ, The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep., p. 136, ¶ 109.
199 See generally ESCR-Net, Global Economy, Global Rights: A Practitioner’s Guide for Interpreting Human Rights Obligations in the Global Economy (2014).
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in the Kiobel case, the United Kingdom and Dutch governments—which as amici curiae opposed the exercise of US extraterritorial Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)
jurisdiction over UK and Dutch companies200 —nonetheless agreed that “active
personality jurisdiction,” by which the United States could apply the ATS extraterritorially to Americans, “is very clearly asserted (and accepted) in State
practice, and is well established in international law.”201 Calling the same principle by a different name, the European Commission termed the “nationality
principle” an “uncontroversial basis for jurisdiction under international law.”202
Granted, any exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a home State must be
“reasonable”—paying due regard to the jurisdictional claims and sovereignty of
the host State—but it is well-accepted under international law that, in principle,
home States may adjudicate suits against their own companies (as opposed to
foreign companies) for human rights violations committed outside their territories.203
International law, then, plainly allows States to engage in reasonable exercises of jurisdiction over the conduct of their corporations in other States. A
treaty on business and human rights, or a protocol thereto, could either explicitly authorize or require States to exercise such extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
treaty or protocol could undertake to articulate guidelines on the parameters of
“reasonableness,” or instead allow courts or legislatures to decide on the reasonableness of particular exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction, in light of general
principles of international law governing jurisdiction.204

200 See Brief of the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 5–6, 18–23;
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
201 Id. at 14. For example, Canadian courts have presumptive jurisdiction over foreign torts where
the defendant is “domiciled or resident” in Canada. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, [2012] 1 S.C.R.
572, paras. 81–82, 85–86, 90(a) (Can.).
202 European Commission Amicus Brief in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013) (No. 10-1491), at 11. EU law, governing the twenty-eight EU member States, Countries, Europa, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2014), and
other European States who join the regulations voluntarily, makes jurisdiction turn mainly on domicile. The EU default rule is that “persons domiciled” in an EU State “shall, whatever their nationality,
be sued in the courts of” the domiciliary State. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
arts. 2.1, 3.1, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 3–4 (EC); Council Decision 2007/712/EC of 15 October 2007 on
the Signing, on Behalf of the Community, of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 2, 3.1, 2007 O.J. (L 339) 3.
In tort cases they may also be sued in the State where the “harmful event” takes place. Brussels I
Regulation, art. 5.3; Lugano II Convention, art. 5.3.
203 See generally D. Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The Supreme
Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1773, 1778–79 (2014).
204 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(1987). Cf. §402 (jurisdiction to prescribe) and §421 (jurisdiction to adjudicate), with §431(1) (jurisdiction to enforce judicially). All three categories authorize states to exercise jurisdiction over acts
abroad by their own nationals, §§402(2), 421(2)(d)–(e), and 431(1), subject to the limit that the
exercise be reasonable. Id. §§403, 421(1)–(2), and 431(1)–(2).
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G.5 What is the scope of corporate responsibility—Will parent companies
be liable for the wrongs of subsidiaries, and vice versa?
In what circumstances should a treaty hold parent companies responsible for
the actions of their subsidiaries or other corporate entities, and vice versa? The
answer may depend on the kinds of duties the treaty imposes. To the extent a
treaty mandates reporting, planning and prevention, including implementation
of the Guiding Principles, it might not be controversial or impracticable to require parent companies to make sure that their subsidiaries (and other corporate
entities, especially controlled entities) meet these responsibilities.
This seems to be the approach of the Guiding Principles. They generally refer to the responsibilities, not of a particular “corporation” or “company,” but
of a “business enterprise.” The term “enterprise” is not defined. However, the
language and logic of the Principles suggest that it embraces both a parent company and its subsidiaries. For example, the Commentary to Guiding Principle
2 cites, as an example of domestic measures with extraterritorial implications,
“requirements on ‘parent’ companies to report on the global operations of the
entire enterprise.” This would make no sense unless the concept of “enterprise”
included both parent companies and their subsidiaries.
The issue becomes more complicated to the extent a treaty mandates civil
damages remedies against corporations. Most States have adopted, in one form
or another, the separate entity doctrine. When one corporation invests in another—
even when the first company owns 100% of the shares of the second, as in the
case of parent companies with wholly owned subsidiaries—the two corporations
are still treated as separate entities for purposes of legal liability. National laws
typically provide, then, that the parent cannot be held legally liable for wrongs
committed by the subsidiary (i.e., the “corporate veil” cannot be pierced), unless the subsidiary is shown to be a mere façade or was created solely in order
to defraud creditors.205
Recent developments in common law cases indicate that, in some limited
circumstances, a parent company can be held to have a “duty of care” to the
employees of a subsidiary, or to persons injured by a subsidiary, the breach of
which can result in legal liability.206 In such cases the parent is held liable, not for
the misconduct of its subsidiary, but rather for its own misconduct in breaching
its duty of care. Negotiators might consider incorporating such a doctrine into
a treaty.
Negotiators might also consider a broader parental company duty of care
in regard to human rights. Without abrogating the general application of the
205 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan et al. v. Talisman Energy Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), affirmed, 582 F. 3d 244 (2d Cir. 1999); see generally G. Skinner, R. McCorquodale
and O. De Schutter, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by
Transnational Business (2013), pp. 59–64.
206 Cf. England and Wales Court of Appeal, Chandler v. Cape PLC, [2012] EWCA Civ 525 (25
April 2012), ¶ 80, and Superior Court of Justice of Ontario, Choe v. HudBay Minerals, Inc., 2013
ONSC 1414, Decision of 22 July 2013, ¶¶74–75, with District Court of The Hague, Akpan v. Royal
Dutch Shell PLC, Case No. C/09/337050/HA ZA 09-1580, Judgment, 30 Jan. 2013 (2013), ¶¶ 3.31,
3.32.
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doctrine of separate entity, negotiators might consider the following recommendation made by three distinguished scholars, in the particular context of a parent
company’s human rights due diligence:
[T]he duty of the parent company to exercise due diligence by controlling the subsidiary to ensure it does not engage in human rights
violations, directly or indirectly, should be clearly affirmed. This
should be seen as part of the due diligence necessary to meet the
corporate responsibility to respect human rights, as set out in the
UNGPs. The concept…amounts to imposing on the parent company
a duty to monitor the activities of its subsidiaries,…This also includes
the responsibility that all businesses seek to prevent and mitigate,
through use of their leverage, all human rights violations by those
with whom they have a business relationship. In contrast to the limited liability approach, this incentivizes the parent company to ensure that its subsidiaries and business partners comply with human
rights.207
This scholarly recommendation is consistent, not only with the “enterprise” approach of the UN Guiding Principles to due diligence, but also with the even
more explicit “enterprise” approach of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises. In calling on business to respect human rights and to carry out
due diligence,208 the OECD Guidelines “extend to enterprise groups, although
boards of subsidiary enterprises might have obligations under the law of their
jurisdiction of incorporation. Compliance and control systems should extend
where possible to these subsidiaries. Furthermore, the board’s monitoring of governance includes continuous review of internal structures to ensure clear lines of
management accountability throughout the group.”209
G.6

Duty bearers: Will the treaty impose direct obligations only on
States, or will it impose direct obligations on business as well?

During the drafting process of the UN Guiding Principles, reports John Ruggie,
governments North and South “had deep seated doctrinal concerns about making corporations subjects of international human rights law.”210 The US statement of objections to the June 2014 UN Human Rights Council treaty resolution
included an assertion that business corporations are not “subjects” of international law.211
207 G. Skinner, R. McCorquodale and O. De Schutter, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies
for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (2013), p. 68.
208 OECD Guidelines (2011), ¶¶ II.2, II.10, and Chapter IV.
209 OECD Guidelines (2011), Commentary on General Policies, ¶ 9.
210 John Ruggie, Response to RAID “Executive Summary”, 23 March 2015, p. 1,
accessible at http://business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Ruggie%
20response%20to%20RAID.pdf.
211 Proposed Working Group, supra note 47.
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There are competing schools of thought among eminent scholars on whether
corporations are subjects of international law.212 Positivists insist that corporations are not subjects of international law, because no international instrument
expressly recognizes them as such.213 More flexible interpreters suggest that corporations may at least have “limited international legal personality.”214 Finally,
pragmatists argue that the issue of whether corporations are “subjects” of international law is irrelevant to the question of what legal responsibilities can be
imposed on corporations: “Skepticism about the ‘personhood’ of corporations
should not be confused with doubts about whether international corporations
have responsibilities (as well as rights) under international law. Clearly they now
have both.”215
At present, thousands of bilateral and multilateral investment and trade agreements grant corporations both substantive rights (e.g., regulatory stability, compensation for property takings, and due process of law) and remedial rights
to sue States before international arbitration panels.216 Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, corporations are also permitted to make claims
against States for property takings and denials of due process of law before the
European Court of Human Rights.217 EU treaties also permit corporations to
bring cases before the European Court of Justice, if their rights have been infringed by an EU institution.218
Whatever one’s view on whether corporations are “subjects” or “legal persons” under international law, if international treaties can grant corporations
rights and remedies, as in these instances, it is difficult to discern why a treaty
cannot also impose human rights duties on corporations, enforceable before national or international courts. Whether a treaty on business and human rights
should impose duties directly on companies would appear to be a policy choice
to be made by the negotiators, one way or the other, and not a decision determined by current international law.

G.7 What is the Role of Lawyers and other Business Advisors?
The legal profession has been among civil society actors promoting implementation of the Guiding Principles. The American Bar Association (“ABA”) has
212 See generally José Alvarez, Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?, 9 Santa Clara
J. Int’l. L. 1 (2011).
213 See Decl. of James Crawford S.C., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc.,
Republic of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
214 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors 79 (2006).
215 Alvarez, supra note 212, at 31 (footnote omitted).
216 See generally Public Citizen, Case Studies: Investor-State Attacks on Public Interest Policies (2014), accessible at http://www.citizen.org/documents/egregious-investor-stateattacks-case-studies.pdf.
217 See generally, e.g., W. van den Muijsenbergh and S. Rezai, Corporations and the European Convention on Human Rights (2012), accessible at http://www.mcgeorge.edu/Documents/
Conferences/GlobeJune2012_Corporationsandthe.pdf.
218 http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm.
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endorsed the Guiding Principles.219 The Business and Human Rights Advisory
Group of the Law Society has recommended, among other measures, that the
Law Society take the position that its law firm members have a responsibility
to respect human rights, and that they should develop policies and procedures
to implement that responsibility.220 The International Bar Association has published pilot guidance for bar associations and business lawyers.221
Law firms and other business advisors, such as consulting and risk management firms, have at least a dual responsibility with regard to human rights: both
as businesses themselves, and as advisors to their business clients.222 While the
ethical rules of the ABA, at least, “may well” affirmatively support these human
rights responsibilities,223 a treaty might commit States to ensure policy coherence
between the human rights responsibilities of lawyers, law firms and other business advisors, and their duties under professional codes of conduct and ethics
promulgated by bar associations and State entities.
H Conclusion
This Paper seeks, not to advocate, but to inform. It takes no position on the advisability of a treaty on business and human rights, or on the form and content
of any such treaty. It is offered in the belief that an informed negotiating process
deserves, at the outset, a basic knowledge of the background that brought negotiators to the table, and an awareness of the main options, issues and choices
that lie before them. It is in that spirit that this Paper has been prepared.
This Paper also provides analysis of the current policy landscape and context
as the treaty process begins. This landscape, however, is constantly shifting, as
States, civil society and businesses engage in further actions in relation to business and human rights.

219 The ABA resolution and accompanying report are accessible at www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions/2014_hod_annual_
meeting_109.authcheckdam.pdf.
220 Law Society, Business and Human Rights Advisory Group Recommendations, Jan. 2014, p.
13, Recs. 1 and 6. See also the Council of Bars and Law Societies, Corporate Responsibility and the
Role of the Legal Profession, accessible at www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/NTCdocument/
EN_07022013_CSR_and_1_1361955115.pdf.
221 Int’l Bar Association (“IBA”), Business and Human Rights Guidance for Bar Associations, and
its Annex, Guidance for Business Lawyers on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (2014).
222 IBA, Guidance for Business Lawyers, supra note 221, at 16–18.
223 “ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 may well apply in this context. It requires
lawyers to exercise ‘independent professional judgment and render candid advice’ and permits them
to ‘refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political
factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.’ …This imperative logically would include
applicable international standards in the conduct of a client’s affairs, including the Framework and
Guiding Principles where corporate clients are concerned.” ABA report, supra note 219, at 5 n. 16
(citation omitted).

